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PROLOGUE
 
An independent judiciary is an essential prerequisite for a democratic State governed by the rule of law. Several international instruments, as well as the jurisprudence of the In-ter-American Court, recognize the independence of the judiciary from other branches 
of government. Judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of the acts of government, 
which is arguably the judiciary’s most significant role in a democratic system, is only possible in 
a context of judicial independence. Therefore, judicial independence is an essential principle for 
ensuring the respect of human rights. 
However, the studies executed and experience acquired by DPLF show that in Latin Amer-
ica, respect for judicial independence is deficient and that, as a result, the judiciaries in the 
region remain weak. Although threats to judicial independence may come from various sectors 
of society, interference in the work of the judiciary is largely caused by other political powers. 
Such interference can be seen clearly in the appointment of ‘friends’ or ‘trusted’ individuals to 
the highest courts of a country. 
This has serious implications, especially in democracies where institutions are still fragile 
and institutional leaders play a fundamental role. Not only do they direct the course of insti-
tutions, but they also act as role models. When their leaders are competent professionals of 
high moral standing, institutions can make important progress in strengthening the rule of 
law. Otherwise, influence-peddling and corruption erode democratic institutions and become 
entrenched. Sadly, this is largely the case in many Latin American countries. 
As a result of attempts to control the high courts of justice through politically motivated 
appointments –instead of nominating candidates based on their merit- the members of the 
highest courts in the region are not necessarily the most qualified professionals, but rather indi-
viduals having a personal or ideological affiliation with the political power in office. At the very 
least, this gives the impression that such judicial officials lack independence. In practice, it also 
prevents the effective separation of powers: due to political influence, the judiciary fails to fulfill 
its democratic role as a check on the other powers of government, hindering the operation of 
the rule of law. 
Besides when influence is purely political, for instance when a powerful sector of the econ-
omy has strong links with the corridors of power, it appears that judicial decisions that affect 
economic interests are controlled by those powers regardless of the public interest. 
Not only is the functioning of a country’s highest courts of justice impacted by shortcom-
ings in the system for the selection of their members, the lower court are affected as well. Due to 
the influence exerted by the highest courts over lower judges in decisions concerning appoint-
ments, promotions and disciplinary matters, controlling the justices of the highest courts of a 
country guarantees the power to influence the entire judiciary. 
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This highlights the fundamental need to improve the systems for the selection and appoint-
ment of the highest court justices. Improvements made in the selection process will not solve all 
the problems affecting the judiciary, but having individuals of greater integrity and ability will 
allow us to begin to address other concerns. 
The main problems identified by DPLF1 are: 
1.	 Lack of an independent and autonomous body responsible for the selection procedure; 
2.	 Lack of a clear and previously established selection procedure explaining how candi-
dates should be assessed; 
3.	 Lack of objective criteria for the assessment of candidates; and 
4.	 Lack of transparency of the selection procedure and lack of meaningful civil society 
engagement in general. 
DPLF has developed Guidelines for a transparent and merit-based system for the appoint­
ment of Supreme Court justices, as an input to improve selection procedures. These guidelines 
are based on international standards, and capture international best practices. The guidelines 
include suggestions concerning selection procedures and the required qualifications for justices. 
With regard to the selection procedure, DPLF considers that: 
■■	 The entities responsible for shortlisting the candidates must be autonomous; 
■■	 The desired profile of justices should be clearly and previously established; 
■■	 The requirements and abilities of candidates should be established and published in 
advance of competitions, and the assessment criteria should be explicitly stated; 
■■ The selection procedure, as well as the responsibilities of all actors engaged in such 
procedure, should be clearly established; 
■■ The transparency and publicity of all stages of this procedure should be ensured; 
■■ The entities responsible for shortlisting the candidates should be able to receive chal­
lenges from different sectors of society against the candidates and to investigate such 
challenges; and 
■■ Public hearings must be held to assess the candidates’ qualifications. 
See: Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), Estado de Derecho e independencia judicial en Centroaméri­
ca, report presented before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, October 2012, available at
www.dplf.org. 
1 
 
 
 
 
The selection of high-level judges in the United States, Europe and Asia  / vii 
To ensure that only the most suitable candidates are selected, DPLF believes that the re­
quired qualifications should include: 
■■	 Independence and impartiality (both objective and subjective); 
■■	 Reputable conduct and a spotless personal and professional record of integrity; 
■■	 Extraordinary knowledge of the law; 
■■	 Good oral and written communication skills and analytical competency; 
■■	 Well-developed creative intelligence; 
■■	 Ability to find solutions to the problems presented to them; 
■■	 Capacity to seek and build consensus; 
■■	 Ability to take into account other people’s views; 
■■	 Commitment to the judiciary as a public institution; 
■■	 Demonstrated commitment to the protection of human rights, democratic values
and transparency; 
■■	 Ability to understand the social and legal consequences of judicial decisions; and 
■■	 Ability to strike a sound balance between a high level of productivity, the quality of
judicial decisions and a careful consideration of cases. 
DPLF has found that comparative experiences regarding the selection of high-level justices 
can provide valuable insight. However, it is important to emphasize that suggesting new models 
or copying those of other countries will not suffice. On the contrary: we should bear in mind 
that each country’s reality is different, and that local experts will be best placed to establish 
which elements would be useful in their country. 
As many countries have dealt with the problems associated with the appointment of high 
court justices, a range of models are now available. Although some have achieved better results 
than others, we feel that important lessons can be drawn from the most salient experiences, 
including unsuccessful cases. Understanding why some practices have worked and others have 
failed is an important step. Learning about these experiences can help national experts develop 
suitable mechanisms for the context of their respective countries. 
For this reason, DPLF considers that a comparative study of judicial appointment practices 
is an important contribution to this discussion. The reputable law firm Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
has generously agreed to conduct this study pro-bono. A highly motivated team of attorneys, 
led by Tefft Smith, and consisting of Michael Fragoso, Christopher Jackson, Christa Laser, and 
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Gregory Wannier from that law firm, performed a comparative analysis of the procedures for 
the appointment of high court justices in the United States, both at the federal and state levels. 
These practices were also examined in other European and Asian countries to provide a fuller 
picture of the selection of justices internationally. 
DPLF believes that this study is a valuable contribution to ideas and debates in Latin Ameri-
ca regarding judicial selection, and would like to thank Kirkland & Ellis LLP for their dedication 
in conducting this research and for their crucial support in making this publication possible. 
Katya Salazar Mirte Postema
Executive Director Senior Program Officer 
Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF) Judicial Independence Program 
Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF) 
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Introduction
 
This paper has been prepared by Kirkland & Ellis LLP for the Due Process of Law Foun-dation (“DPLF”), an organization dedicated to promoting and strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights in the Americas. The goal is to provide further 
stimulus to the enhancement of due process and the rule of law in Latin America by encour-
aging the transparent, merit-based selection and appointment of competent, independent, and 
impartial judges. An independent and impartial judiciary is an essential precondition to the 
effective operation of the rule of law, with due process for all. This, in turn, is vital for the exis-
tence of democratic societies. 
There is general recognition that the protection of human rights and the promotion of eco-
nomic development are best achieved under a political system governed by the rule of law. The 
critical importance of the rule of law is underscored by the recently initiated and comprehensive 
World Justice Project (“WJP”), financed by the Bill Gates Foundation and others. The Project 
was premised on the principle that “[e]stablishing the rule of law is fundamental to achieving 
communities of opportunity and equity—communities that offer sustainable economic devel-
opment, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights.”2 
The overall success of a nation -- both politically and economically -- is enhanced by the 
perception of its general populace that the decisions of the country’s judicial system are based 
on the rule of law, instead of on political influence or economic corruption. The World Eco-
nomic Forum issues an annual Global Competitiveness Report (“GCR”) that analyzes various 
countries’ legal systems on a variety of factors that highlight the importance of the rule of law 
for the functioning of democratic societies, with due process for all. 3 
The GCR report focuses on a country’s “institutional environment.” That is largely “deter-
mined by the legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms and govern-
ments interact[.]” Key factors for an institutional environment  are “judicial independence . . . 
from influences of members of government, citizens or firms;” legal protection of intellectual 
and other property rights; the level of corruption in judicial and governmental decisionmaking; 
the “efficiency” of the legal system in allowing challenges to governmental action and regulation 
and in resolving private disputes; and the “transparency” of governmental decision-making.4 
Both the World Justice Project and the GCR have analyzed how effective the rule of law is in 
Latin America. They report that the general perception is that, in many Latin American coun-
tries, the judiciary is neither politically independent nor impartial. There is a belief that much 
of the Latin American judiciary is subject to executive governmental and economic corruption. 
As the WJP observed, “Latin America presents a picture of sharp contrasts. In spite of recent 
2	 Mark David Agrast et al., The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 1 (2013), http:// 
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf (hereinafter “WJP 2013”). 
3	 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 4 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2011), 
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011-12.pdf (hereinafter “GCR”). 
4	 Id  at 395, 390-409. 
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movements towards openness and political freedoms that have positioned many countries at 
the forefront of protecting basic rights and civil liberties, the region’s public institutions remain 
fragile. Corruption and a lack of government accountability are still prevalent[.]”5 
Likewise, the GCR states that first among “the persistent challenges” that face Latin Amer-
ican countries is “weak” legal and other institutions. Indeed, on the critical issue of judicial 
independence, out of 142 nations rated, Venezuela ranked dead last, Paraguay was 138th, Nic-
aragua 136th, Panama 133rd, Ecuador 130th, Argentina 124th, Peru 119th, Guatemala 117th, 
El Salvador 106th, Bolivia 100th, Mexico 89th, Colombia 81st, Honduras 77th, and Brazil 71st. 
Only Costa Rica (38th) and Chile (24th) had above-average ratings.6 
As emphasized in the World Justice Project, an essential element for assuring that judges 
are impervious to efforts at political and economic corruption (and that their rulings are based 
on the law and facts) is to assure that the judicial selection process produces a competent, in-
dependent, and impartial judiciary, committed to due process for all. Indeed, one of “the four 
universal principles” for the proper functioning of the rule of law is that “[j]ustice is delivered by 
competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, 
have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.”7 
“Independence” means freedom from political influence or economic corruption. “Compe-
tence” is defined not only by knowledge of the law but by life and legal experience, and by a “ju-
dicial temperament.” “Impartiality” is the core qualification that has been consistently identified 
as being the type of judicial temperament desired for an independent judiciary. 
The need for a competent and independent judiciary is universally recognized as essential 
to individual rights and due process of law. As Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights notes, “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals [and] ev-
eryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”8 Likewise, Article 8 of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights provides: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a 
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established 
by law[.]”9 
Many differing methods have been tried (with varying degrees of success) to promote the 
existence of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary. Selection processes range from 
executive appointment (sometimes with legislative approval), to popular elections, to selection 
by “senior” judges, or groups of legal professionals. Differing terms of service exist, varying 
from lifetime appointments, to specific numbers of years, to life tenure with various mandatory 
retirement ages and/or unless removed by popular vote, executive or legislative action. 
5	 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 44. 
6	 GCR, supra note 3, at 31, 395. 
7	 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 9. 
8	 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
9	 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Article 8, section 1 (Nov. 
22, 1969) available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm. 
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Each of these approaches has its pros and cons.  The following is a review of how judges 
are selected in the United States and in a cross-section of European and Asian countries. The 
focus is upon the process for selecting the judges for the “Supreme” or highest court in each 
jurisdiction. Typically, a nation’s Supreme Court sets the tone for the rest of the judicial system. 
The Supreme Court is often not only the final authority on the interpretation of a nation’s laws, 
but is also responsible for the internal administration of the country’s judicial system. Further, a 
nation’s Supreme Court often also has disciplinary (as well as appellate review) powers over the 
nation’s lower-court judges. 
In sum, there is no “perfect” model for selecting judges for the highest courts of a country. 
The results that will be obtained by any particular model are highly dependent on the political 
and social context of a country—or state. A method that works well in a particular country 
might not produce desirable results elsewhere, which is why an analysis of the local context is 
always an essential starting point. That said, the analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
selection methods adopted in the United States and in various European and Asian countries 
may be instructive in assessing what might work for any country considering efforts to enhance 
the effectiveness of the operation of the rule of law in that country. 
It is important to note, however, that the process for the appointment of a nation’s Supreme 
Court justices is but one factor in enhancing the effectiveness of the rule of law in that country. 
The importance of whom is to become a Supreme Court justice means that better candidates 
emerge and the process of selection becomes of greater public interest, promoting the transpar-
ency that is essential to the best outcomes for the public at large. The size of the Supreme Court 
matters as well; it should be a reasonable, uneven number. Too many justices make deliberations 
and decision making inefficient. 
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of life tenure (as is still granted to U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices) in an age of extended longevity. Mandatory retirement ages have been 
adopted in many jurisdictions, with no seemingly detrimental effects on the ability to attract 
competent persons to serve on a nation’s highest court. A mandatory retirement age—of not less 
than 70 nor more than 80 years of age—seems sensible to this day and age. 
Experience also suggests that the best outcomes are achieved where judicial pay and pen-
sions are guaranteed. 
To minimize existing governmental control over the judiciary, it has been shown that the 
right to remove a Supreme Court justice should be carefully circumscribed to conduct detri-
mental to the independence and integrity of the Supreme Court itself, e.g., evidence of corrup-
tion, mental incapacity, criminal misconduct, etc. The process for removal should mirror the 
method for approving a justice. No justice should be removed without having the due process 
of open hearings on the grounds for removal. Impeachment should, for example, require a two-
thirds majority vote to deter ready resort to the removal process for political dissatisfaction. 
At the end of this paper, we will elaborate on these points and make more detailed sugges-
tions on the qualifications that are desirable for the justices of a nation’s Supreme Court. Ulti-
mately, it is the quality of the justices that will best assure their independence, impartiality and 
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effectiveness in enforcing the rule of law. Consideration should be given to promoting diversity 
on the Supreme Court, with a fair representation of women and differing ethnicities residing in 
the nation involved. 
Lastly, and most importantly, it is essential for the effective operation of the rule of law that 
there be a societal as well as a governmental commitment to equal justice for all. That is best 
achieved by active attention to and coverage by the press and other media of what then becomes
a transparent, public process for the appointment and selection of the nation’s Supreme Court 
justices. The societal commitment is further fostered by educating the nation’s citizenry—from 
an early age—on the values of free speech and freedom of the press and the benefits of a compe-
tent and independent judiciary, with Supreme Court justices who can and will enforce the rule 
of law, with due process for all. Therefore, a courageous press and committed educators at all 
levels are need if there is to develop the type of  societal demand for the rule of law and respect 
for human rights that will be honored by the nation’s  governmental officials. 
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I. The Appointment Process for Justices 
of the U.S. Supreme Court 
A. The Evolution of the Supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court  
The respected standing of the United States Supreme Court, as the accepted ultimate arbiter 
of all important legal issues facing American society, is the product of a long (albeit early on 
contentious) evolution. Indeed, the American Revolution of 1776 was in large part prompted by 
complaints of American colonists about the arbitrary and extraordinary power of the “judges” 
appointed by the designees of the English King.10 “Judges” were appointed not so much for their 
legal acumen as their social and political connections. Being a judge was simply one among 
many political and administrative powers.11 
Accordingly, immediately after the American Revolution there were efforts in many of the 
former English colonies to reduce the influence of the judiciary. The resulting chaos yielded the 
U.S. Constitution, with its “checks and balances,” and tripartite “separation of [Executive, Leg-
islative and Judicial] powers.” The Judiciary was given an equal place within the governmental 
structure alongside the Executive and the Legislative branches.12 Article III of the Constitution 
provided for U.S. Supreme Court Justices to be appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to hold office “during good Behavior,” effectively life tenure. 
A lifetime appointment (subject only to Legislative impeachment for gross malfeasance) 
was viewed as necessary to protect the impartiality of judicial decisionmakers from fear of ret-
ribution by public and private actors.13 The drafters of the Constitution believed that life ten-
ure would ensure an “independent spirit in the judges” that would permit them to protect the 
Constitution from “encroachment” of the more political branches of government. The drafters 
explained that “nothing can contribute so much to [the federal judiciary’s] firmness and inde-
pendence as permanency in office.”14  The belief was that, if a judge could be removed for a po-
litically unpopular decision, the judge would be much more likely to render politically popular 
decisions so that his or her future career would be better protected after leaving office. As one 
scholar has observed, “Regardless of whether a judge is elected by the public or appointed by 
public officials, if the judge has life tenure, it is thought that the judge will feel free to enforce
10	 “Indeed, one of the major complaints of the American colonists against royal authority in the eighteenth 
century was the extraordinary degree of discretion exercised by royal judges.” Gordon S. Wood, Comment, 
in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 49, 50 (1997). 
11	 Id. at 53. Professor Wood tells of one “Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts,” who, in the 1760s, was “chief 
justice of the superior court, lieutenant governor, member of the [legislative] council, and judge of probate 
of Suffolk County all at the same time.” 
12	 Id. at 52. 
13	 Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 579, 584, 591 (2005). 
14	 Denis Steven Rutkus, Congressional Research Service, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the 
President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate 1 (2010) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 78). 
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constitutional restrictions on public preferences. By contrast, if the judge has to come before the 
public or even elected officials periodically, it is thought that the judge may not feel so free.”15 
Independence was further protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of the judiciary’s pay, 
so that the Legislature cannot use compensation as a tool of control. The reasoning was that, if 
a judge could keep the job but face a pay cut for rendering politically unpopular decisions, the 
judge would again be leery of making those decisions.16 
Notwithstanding the intent of the Constitution’s authors, initially there were questions 
about the political independence and impartiality of the first appointees to the Supreme Court. 
Justices John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth notably operated as diplomats while on the first Supreme 
Court. Jay even served simultaneously as Secretary of State and the Court’s Chief Justice.17 
Shortly before John Adams’s defeat by Thomas Jefferson in the Presidential election of 1800, 
Adams appointed one of his “Federalist” friends, Samuel Chase, as a Supreme Court Justice, 
with the consent of the then-Federalist-controlled Senate. The “Democrats” (or “Jeffersonians”) 
who won both houses of Congress as well as the Presidency, promptly attempted to impeach 
Justice Chase based on his alleged Federalist partiality. That effort failed, thereby setting an im-
portant and now respected precedent in the United States that the Legislature should exercise 
caution in attempting to influence the Supreme Court with even the threat of impeachment 
proceedings. No U.S. Supreme Court Justice has ever been impeached.18 
Fortuitously, the United States was blessed with the early emergence (and long tenure, from 
1801 to 1835) of John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall 
“retreated from . . . advanced and exposed political positions” and forcefully fostered the pre-
eminence of the impartial rule of law.19  This was most dramatically demonstrated in the most 
famous of all Supreme Court decisions, Marbury v. Madison. There, in 1803, the Court declared 
in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, that it had the right to invalidate Congressional legisla-
tion as inconsistent with the rules of law established by the Constitution.20 
15	 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of 
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va. L. Rev. 839, 852-53 (2012). 
16	 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not 
be diminished during their continuance in office.”). 
17	 Wood, supra note 10, at 55. 
18	 See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 114 (1992) (“The acquittal of Samuel Chase by the Senate
had a profound impact on the American judiciary. First, it assured the independence of federal judges from
congressional oversight of the decisions they made in the cases that came before them. Second, by assuring
that impeachment would not be used in the future as a method to remove members of the Supreme Court
for their judicial opinions, it helped to safeguard the independence of that body.”).  While impeachment and
conviction is possible, no justice has ever been removed from office involuntarily, though one, Samuel Chase,
was impeached but acquitted, some were investigated but not impeached, and another resigned prior to an
investigation. Rutkus, supra note 19, at 2 n. 6.
19	 Id. at 56. 
20	 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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That was the start of a process that has resulted in American “[j]udges ha[ving] acquired an 
independent standing in American culture,” which enabled them to effectively curb abuses of 
executive and legislative power.21 
B. The Transparent Selection Process for U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices 
1. The Formal Process 
The “Appointments Clause” of the Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court.”22 
The Senate has developed detailed procedures to evaluate a candidate once nominated by the 
President. The Senate proceedings have become very public, with live televised hearings at all 
levels and intense media coverage. 
Since the mid-1800s, the judicial nominees selected by the President have been reviewed 
first by the Senate’s Judiciary Committee.23 The Committee issues each nominee an extensive 
personal data questionnaire seeking information on the nominee’s past legal experience, finan-
cial holdings, and writings. Most of the answers are made part of the public record for media 
and other commentary, with the exception of certain financial information and information 
from the FBI’s investigation of the candidate.  The Committee also asks follow-up questions 
of the nominee (often based on suggestions from the press and interested citizens who have 
reviewed the publicly released materials). There are also requests for information issued to or-
ganizations for which the nominee worked.24 
By tradition, the chair of the Judiciary Committee invites the American Bar Association 
to make an evaluation of the professional qualifications of the nominee. The ABA’s assessment 
focuses on the issues of “integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament.” Specif-
ically, when considering “integrity,” the ABA looks to the opinions of the legal community on 
the nominee’s character and reputation.  The ABA’s evaluation of “professional competence” 
embodies qualities including knowledge, writing skill, and legal experience. When evaluating 
“judicial temperament,” the ABA considers traits including the nominee’s patience, decisive-
ness, and commitment to equality under the law.25 
Customarily, the ABA is the first witness at the public hearings that the Committee holds
to assess the qualifications of the nominee.26 In making its recommendation, the ABA reviews
the nominee’s personal history and any published judicial opinions, written statements and other
writings. The ABA utilizes groups of law professors and others who specialize in the Supreme
21	 Wood, supra note 10, at 49, 58. 
22	 U.S. Const., art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
23	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 2. 
24	 Id. at 22. 
25	 American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is and 
How it Works 3 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf. 
26	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 24-26. 
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Court to review the materials. It conducts ex-
ABA’s Considerations: tensive confidential interviews with judges,
•	 Integrity: “the prospective nominee’s
character and general reputation in
the legal community, as well as the
prospective nominee’s industry and
diligence” 
•	 Professional Competence: “intellectual
capacity, judgment, writing and analytical
abilities, knowledge of the law, and
breadth of professional experience” 
•	 Judicial Temperament: “compassion,
decisiveness, open-mindedness,
courtesy, patience, freedom from bias,
and commitment to equal justice under
the law” 
lawyers and others who are familiar with the
nominee’s experience and character. The ABA
then interviews the nominee, providing him
or her with an opportunity to rebut any un-
favorable information. Finally, the ABA pre-
pares a written report on the nominee, which
is sent to the President and to the Judiciary
Committee. The ABA rates the nominee as
“not qualified,” “qualified,” or “well-qualified.”
The ABA has, with few exceptions, found
Supreme Court nominees to be “well-quali-
fied.”27 
The nominee will then testify before, 
and be questioned by, the Judiciary Commit-
tee. Interested organization representatives 
and citizens can ask to appear to make statements and be questioned about their support for (or 
opposition to) the candidate. Following the hearing, the Judiciary Committee will recommend 
(or not recommend) the candidate for confirmation. The Senate typically accepts the Commit-
tee’s recommendation, with the most recent exception being the confirmation of now-Justice 
Clarence Thomas, nominated by President George H.W. Bush in 1991. Justice Thomas was con-
firmed by a 52-48 vote in the full Senate, overriding a close Judiciary Committee vote recom-
mending against his nomination.28 
The full Senate vote follows a floor debate amongst the Senators. Both the Judiciary Com-
mittee’s hearings leading up to its recommendation and the floor debate are televised, live. As 
noted, this has resulted in intense media and public scrutiny of the process and the qualifica-
tions and character of the nominees.29 
Almost all of the materials that the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate consider are 
27	 American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is 
and How it Works 9 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_ 
build/federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf; see also American Bar Association, 
Evaluations of Supreme Court Nominations, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
committees/federal_judiciary/resources/supreme_court_nominations.html (providing a rating and written 
report on nominees); Statement of Kim J Askew Concerning the Nomination of The Honorable Elena 
Kagan before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States (July 1, 2010), at 5, 10 available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scfedjud/SCpage/kaganstatement.authcheckdam.pdf);
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 24-26, 35 n. 133. 
28	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 2 29-35. 
29	 Id. at 35-38.  For example, public broadcast television typically shows the entirety of the hearings, while 
private news organizations will highlight and comment on important clips.  Additionally, the nominee’s 
answers at the hearings are subject to commentary in newspapers and editorials.  See, e.g., Charlie Savage & 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kagan Follows Precedent by Offering Few Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/us/30kagan.html. 
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made a part of the public record. For example, the voluminous materials for the recent hearings 
concerning President Obama’s nominations of Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor were avail-
able by retrievable internet links on the Judiciary Committee’s website. The links included the 
answers to the Committee’s questionnaire, responses of all parties to other information requests, 
and letters received favoring (or opposing) the respective nominations.30 As a consequence of all 
of this scrutiny, the appointment process for U.S. Supreme Court Justices has become an intense 
and lengthy, multi-month exercise.  
For example, Elena Kagan was nominated in May 2010 and confirmed in August 2010. 
Sonia Sotomayor was nominated in May 2009 and confirmed in August 2009. Samuel Alito was 
nominated in November 2005 and confirmed in January 2006.  Each was the subject of intense 
press, internet and other media and public scrutiny. 
2. Informal Processes 
Presidents recognize that the choice of a Supreme Court Justice, with life tenure, can have an 
impact lasting long beyond the term of their Presidency.31 Given the importance of the selection 
of a Justice, Presidents carefully consider whom to nominate. 
The President solicits recommendations from high-level advisors within the Cabinet, as 
well as from private lawyers and other sources. The Office of the Counsel to the President ex-
haustively vets potential candidates. A nominee’s financial records are examined by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations. Presidents typically conduct in-person interviews of prospective nom-
inees to make sure that they are comfortable with making a choice which has proven to be one 
of the most important Presidential acts.32 
To maximize the likelihood of a successful appointment (and to minimize the delay and 
disruption of divisive confirmation battles), Presidents typically consult with Senators in ad-
vance, seeking bi-partisan support, before they formally nominate a candidate. Presidents (di-
rectly or through Executive Office advisors) discuss potential candidates with Congressional 
leaders for both parties, the members of the Judiciary Committee and Senators from the home 
state of the potential nominee.33 
Given the recognized importance and public interest in who will become a Supreme Court 
Justice, Presidents also float the names of potential candidates to the press to gauge the media’s 
reactions, before formally nominating anyone. This is a more recent phenomenon given the 
30	 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Supreme Court of The United States, http://www. 
judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/SupremeCourt/SupremeCourt.cfm; United States Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court - Elena Kagan, http://www.judiciary.senate. 
gov/nominations/SupremeCourt/KaganIndex.cfm; see also, e.g., U.S. Government Printing Office, Senate 
Hearing 111-1044: The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/html/CHRG-111shrg67622.htm. 
31	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 3 n. 9 (“Looking back on his appointment a quarter century before, [President] 
Adams in 1826 was quoted as saying, ‘My gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the 
proudest act of my life.’”). 
32	 Id. at 7, 11-14; 12 n. 46. 
33	 Id. at 7. 
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emergence of an increasingly partisan and aggressive 24/7 internet and cable television media.34 
The media itself engages in ongoing speculation as to who are the likely candidates for the next 
Supreme Court vacancy.35 
Given the intensity, importance and public focus on the Senate hearings, the Office of the 
Counsel to the President spends considerable time and effort to help the nominee prepare for 
the Judiciary Committee hearing, and the many interviews requested by individual Senators 
before the final confirmation vote.36 
C. Criteria for Selection 
1. Formal Criteria 
Other than the requirement for “good Behavior,” there are no formal rules as to who can be a 
Supreme Court Justice. 
2. Informal Criteria 
There are, however, many informal considerations. At a minimum, the President wants to 
demonstrate that his Office has made a careful choice of someone with high professional quali-
fications, an impeccable character, legal experience and a judicial temperament.37 
These are the factors that are considered to be “givens” for a Supreme Court nominee. They 
are the criteria expressly evaluated by the American Bar Association in making its standard 
report to the Senate Judiciary Committee.38 They are also the criteria stated to be the primary 
considerations by the President and all Senators involved.39 
a) Judicial Temperament:  Integrity, Impartiality and Competence 
The most often-cited professional qualification of a Supreme Court nominee is “judicial tem-
perament.” A 1996 report by the Commission on Judicial Selection declared “judicial tempera-
ment” to be the “most important” of all qualifications.40 As one of the Founding Fathers of the 
Constitution observed: “[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill 
in the laws to qualify them for the status as judges. And making the proper deductions for the 
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the 
requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.”41 
34 Id. at 26-27.
 
35 See, e.g., Bill Mears, Supreme Court Possibilities if Obama is Reelected, CNN, Oct. 1, 2012, available at http://
 
www.cnn.com/2012/09/30/politics/court-obama-list. 
36	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 28. 
37	 Rutkus, supra note 14. at 8. 
38	 American Bar Association, supra note 27 at 9-10. 
39	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 10-11, 38. 
40	 Miller Center of Public Affairs, Improving the Process of Appointing Federal Judges: A Report of the Miller 
Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges 10 (1996). 
41	 Rutkus, supra note 14 at 10 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 (1788), in The Federalist by 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay 496 (Benjamin Fletcher, ed.1966)). 
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Presidents have consistently declared that a judicial temperament is the key qualification.42 
Senators who argue against a nominee typically assert that the candidate will advocate from the 
bench for some specific group of people or cause (e.g. pro- or anti-abortion), claiming that such 
a person lacks the requisite judicial temperament and would “abandon impartiality and instead 
engage in results-oriented judging.”43 
As for the other qualifications, “integrity” encompasses such traits as character, reputa-
tion in the legal community, industry, and diligence. “Professional competence” is measured by 
“qualities of intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the 
law, and breadth of professional and judicial experience.”44 
Recent empirical research demonstrates that, while Senators are likely to support a politi-
cally similar candidate with imperfect qualifications, they are also likely to support a politically 
distinct candidate who has the traditional qualifications of established legal competency, a judi-
cial temperament and a track record of independence and impartiality.45 
b) Political Considerationsa 
Many believe that integrity, competence and impartiality should be the only criteria for a U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice. As a prominent, long-serving member of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee stated, “[T]he Senate’s responsibility to provide advice and consent does not include an 
ideological litmus test because a nominee’s personal opinions are largely irrelevant so long as 
the nominee can set those opinions aside and follow the law fairly and impartially as a judge.”46 
That was not the case in the unsuccessful 1987 nomination by President Ronald Reagan of 
then-D.C. Circuit judge Robert Bork. Judge Bork had been a prolific writer, espousing views 
that were widely regarded as “conservative,” socially, economically and politically. He had been 
a vocal critic of prior Supreme Court decisions on abortion and affirmative action. The result 
was a Judiciary Committee hearing focused on Judge Bork’s likely views on these and other 
“hot-button” issues. This focus was a radical departure from the traditional nomination hear-
ings, which had involved deference to the President’s appointment powers, largely being limited 
to an inquiry into the nominee’s qualifications: did the nominee go to a good law school, suc-
ceed in law school, serve well on a respected court, have a good professional reputation, etc.?  
The questioning of Judge Bork was hostile; his responses were often contentious. The Ju-
diciary Committee recommended against his nomination, and the full Senate rejected Judge 
42	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 10-11 (noting that both Bush and Obama considered this quality necessary). 
43	 Statement of Senator Jon Kyl, Senate Hearing 111-1044: The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/html/ 
CHRG-111shrg67622.htm. 
44	 American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is and 
How it Works, 3 (2009) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf. 
45	 Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1145, 1146-49 (2005), at 1148. The empirical study based an assessment of qualifications 
on several factors, including the nominee rating produced by the ABA. Id. at 1158. 
46	 Elizabeth Rybicki, Supreme Court Nominations 43 (2010). 
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Bork’s nomination on the stated grounds of “lack of judicial temperament,” rather than his per-
sonal beliefs on societal, economic or political issues.47 
Judge Bork’s experience has chastened subsequent nominees in their approach to Senate 
hearings and their willingness to discuss publicly their views on the significant social, political 
and economic issues of the day. Since the “borking of Judge Bork,” subsequent nominees have 
been increasingly guarded in their answers to questions, avoiding any public statements that 
might reveal anything other than middle-of-the-road views. As one prominent Supreme Court 
practitioner recently observed, “It has led to the process being a lot more opaque on what the 
nominees are willing to say, and it’s had a chilling effect on people’s willingness to speak on top-
ics generally if they think they might be candidates for nomination. . . . It creates a strange ritual 
of senators asking substantive questions and nominees basically having to say they can’t answer 
those questions. It has a ritualized Kabuki dance kind of element or aspect that I’d say makes for 
a . . . different process.”48 
Some legal scholars have called the current Supreme Court appointment process “broken,” 
arguing that it has become so politicized that transparency has been lost. The Senate hearings 
and media coverage have tended to focus on specific ideological issues like abortion, to the ex-
clusion of competency, impartiality and judicial temperament. Critics base this argument on the 
fact that the amount of media and interest-group attention on actual and prospective nominees 
has grown, with extensive special interest group testimony occurring at Senate hearings.49 
Other scholars have favorably noted that “controversy about individuals to serve as jurists is 
both a longstanding feature of American politics and reflective of the role that law itself plays in 
American politics.”50 This is because the Supreme Court has regularly handed down rulings that 
address pressing social controversies, sometimes with 5-4 votes, reflecting the then prevailing 
“conservative” vs. “liberal” complexion of the Court.51 Today, the public as well as the Senate 
knows that social issues will be shaped by the Court: “Who the life-tenured judges are is a matter 
of great political moment.”52 
These realities have prompted increasing criticism of the lifetime appointment of Supreme 
Court Justices. The United States’ establishment of life tenure is unique in the world. It permits 
Justices to retire any time they wish, e.g., when an opening on the Court would be advanta-
geous to a particular political party.53 Some speculate that Justice Stevens, generally regarded as 
a “liberal Justice,” stayed on the Court until he was 90 years old so that President Obama (rather 
47	 Linda Chiem, Bork’s Failed High Court Bid Reshaped Judicial Vetting, Law360, Dec. 19, 2012. 
48	 Id. (quoting Christopher Landau of Kirkland & Ellis LLP); see also Dion Farganis & Justin Wedeking, No
Hints, No Forecasts, No Previews: Analyzing Supreme Court Nominee Evasiveness, 1955-2009, 45 U. Ken. L. & 
Soc. R. 525, 554-55 (2011), available at http://www.uky.edu/~jpwede2/lawsocietycandor.pdf. 
49	 Epstein et al., supra note 45, at 1145, 1146-49. 
50	 Resnik, supra note 13, at 585. 
51	 Rutkus, supra note 14, at 5 & n. 16 (noting that liberals tend to favor this approach as addressing civil rights 
issues that are mishandled by legislatures, while conservatives disfavor this approach as not contemplated by 
the Constitution). 
52	 Resnik, supra note 13, at 588 (emphasis in the original). 
53	 Id. at 580. 
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than President Bush) would nominate his successor, presumably someone more “liberal” than 
President Bush was likely to have nominated.54 
c) Diversity 
As noted above, one critical condition for the effective operation of the rule of law is that all peo-
ple have equal access to the legal system. This means not only that there should be no artificial 
constraints on who can be a litigant, but that all people (regardless of race, religion, gender or 
cultural background) have equal opportunity to serve in the judiciary. The reasoning is that a 
diverse judiciary produces a more democratic application of the rule of law.55 
Diversity of race and gender are qualifications that Presidents have increasingly focused 
upon. President Obama emphasized the desire for diversity in his appointments to the Supreme 
Court, nominating two women (one Hispanic).56 Earlier, President Reagan in appointing the 
first woman to the Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) said, “I made a commitment 
that one of my first appointments to a Supreme Court vacancy would be the most qualified 
woman that I could possibly find.”57 
D. U.S. Supreme Court Lessons 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial selection and appointment process is relatively simple, with 
its “checks and balances” approach of nomination by the Executive, with confirmation by the 
Legislative branch. As such it is readily explainable to the general populace, thereby promoting 
public interest and attention. And the transparency of the process (given a free press and evo-
lution through education and press attention of the public interest in who is appointed), has 
produced one of the most developed and effective legal systems in the world. 
Indeed, the contentiousness of the recent appointments has had the positive effect of in-
creasing public awareness and scrutiny of candidates. The net result is that the President’s rep-
utation is affected by the choice of a nominee, as are the reputations of the Senators and overall 
legislature by their/its handling of the nomination. As a consequence, there are incentives to 
select and appoint highly qualified individuals, regardless of their specific political views or 
party affiliations. 
The key lesson is the importance of encouraging public awareness, interest and debate 
about the process for selecting and appointing Supreme Court justices. This requires a trans-
54	 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Future of an Aging Court Raises Stakes of Presidential Vote, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/presidential-election-could-reshape-an-aging-su-
preme-court.html. 
55	 Resnik, supra  note 13, at 591. 
56	 U.S. President (Obama, Barack H.), “Remarks on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor To Be a Supreme Court
Associate Justice,” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 26, 2009, DCPD-200900402, p. 1. 
57	 U.S. President (Reagan, Ronald W.), “Remarks Announcing the Intention To Nominate Sandra Day O’Con-
nor To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, July 7, 1981,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 596. 
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parent process and education of the public—by the press and in all levels of schooling—about 
the importance of competent, independent and impartial judges, for the enhancement of the 
economic development of the nation and the protection of individual rights. 
A culture of free and open debate must be fostered for all this to occur. That starts with 
early childhood education focusing on the value of judicial checks on executive and legislative 
power. A culture of open discussion and debate is promoted by a free press that understands 
the importance of the judicial selection process and its impact on the effective functioning of 
the rule of law. A free press is critical to the transparency that best assures that the judges who 
are appointed have the competence, independence and impartiality to maximize the probability 
(and public perception) that judicial decisions will be made based on the published rules of law, 
rather than political influence or economic corruption. 
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II. The Judicial Selection and Appointment 

Process in Various U.S. Individual States
 
While the process for selecting and appointing U.S. Supreme Court Justices has been widely praised, it is noteworthy that a number of individual states within the United States have adopted materially different approaches for the selection and approval 
of the judges for the “Supreme Court” of their states.58 That is significant because much of the 
economic and criminal enforcement activity in the U.S. is governed by state, not federal law. 
As can be seen in the chart below, thirteen states elect their Supreme Court judges in “non-
partisan” (i.e., no political-party affiliations) elections. Nine states use partisan elections, for a 
total of twenty-two states (out of 51, counting the District of Columbia) with popularly elected 
jurists. Twenty-three states (including the District of Columbia) begin their appointment pro-
cess with some form of nominating commission. An additional 10 states use this process for 
interim appointments only. Of the remaining six states, four (California, Maine, Massachusetts 
and New Jersey) allow their governor to appoint, with either legislative or other executive ap-
proval. Two states (South Carolina and Virginia) ask their legislatures to select judges.59 
Eighteen states have no retirement age. Thirty-two states (and the District of Columbia) 
have mandatory retirement ages, variously set at 70, 72, 74 and 75, with one (Vermont) at 90.60 
Some states allow judges to finish out the term for which they were elected or appointed.61 There 
have been a number of efforts in various states to increase mandatory retirement ages, e.g., to 
age 75 or 80.62 
Notably, the various state alternatives to the U.S. Supreme Court model have not generated 
any generally acknowledged improvements. Indeed, the independence of the judiciary in many 
states has increasingly been called into question. “The independence of today’s state judges re-
sembles that of their federal counterparts much less than it did at the Founding . . . [when] the 
vast majority of state judges were selected and tenured much like federal judges . . . [T]here are
58	 For a thorough overview of the various processes and perspectives, see Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges 
to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Geo. L.J. 1077 (2007), available at  http://georgetown.lawreviewnetwork.com/ 
files/pdf/95-4/schotland.pdf. 
59	 American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selec-
tion/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=. 
60	 Judgepedia, Mandatory Retirement, http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Mandatory_retirement (last visited 
July 1, 2013) (a chart of retirement ages in each state and the constitutional provision or statute that man-
dates that age). 
61	 Id.; see e.g., Florida Constitution Art. V, Sec. 8.; Louisiana Constitution Art. V, Sec. 23. 
62	 Gavel to Gavel,  A review of state legislation affecting the courts: Florida bill would raise mandatory judi­
cial retirement age, (Feb. 14, 2013),http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2013/02/14/florida-bill-would-raise-man-
datory-judicial-retirement-age-but-as-in-past-efforts-theres-a-catch/; John Caher, Assembly Bill Would
Raise Retirement Age for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2013, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202590476464&Assembly_Bill_Would_Raise_Retirement_Age_for_Judges&slre-
turn=20130316181407. 
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almost no state judges today who enjoy life tenure, and almost all of them must run in some sort 
of election or referendum before the public in order to win or keep their jobs.”63 
The impetus for the various state experiments was the belief that the election of judges (and 
other public officials) would make them responsive to the people and not to politicians, thus 
enhancing their independence. However, a number of studies have concluded that the effect has 
been to reduce the independence of state court judges. As one scholar has observed, “The overall 
effect was to increase the governors’ and legislatures’ control over reappointment, and to weaken 
judges’ power.”64 
The states discussed below present a cross-section of the differing judicial selection process-
es existing amongst various individual states in the United States. . 
A. Nominating Commissions with Gubernatorial Appointments 
1. New York 
Many in the United States regard New York as having a particularly good state judicial system. 
Decisions of New York’s highest court (the N.Y. Court of Appeals) are often cited by courts of 
other states, as respected precedents. 
New York’s system for appointing justices to its Court of Appeals is instructive. New York 
initially decided to elect its judges by popular vote. This was done in the belief that direct elec-
tion of judges would bring the administration of justice under the control of the public, thereby 
avoiding the perception that judges solely came from the “elite” of society, favoring the interests 
of the wealthy over those of the public at large. 
In 1977, New York rejected popular elections for its Court of Appeals judges, adopting a 
system in which a nominating commission recommends candidates for appointment by New 
York’s Governor. The impetus for the change was widespread dissatisfaction over a series of 
what appeared to be heavily financed and ideologically partisan elections that, in the eyes of 
many, raised questions about the competency, independence and impartiality of the judges be-
ing elected.65 A task force, including the head of the N.Y. State Bar Association, was appointed 
by the Governor to study various approaches, ultimately making the recommendations adopted 
in 1977.66 
63	 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of 
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va. L. Rev. 839, 850, 853 (2012). 
64	 Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 Yale L.J. 1528, 1531 (2012) (“[R]eformers hoped 
that popular elections for as many public offices as possible would place government in the hands of the 
electorate and out of the control of political professionals.”); see also Jed H. Shugerman, Economic Crisis and 
the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061, 1063, 1075 (2010) (arguing that 
judicial elections were a response to the financial crises of the 1830s and were intended to strengthen the 
judicial review power of the courts against the profligate state legislatures). 
65	 Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Urges New Way to Select Judges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1976. 
66	 Daniel Becker & Malia Reddick, Judicial Selection Reform:  Examples from Six States. Des 
Moines, IA:  American Judicature Society, 2003 22-23 (2003) (hereinafter “AJS6”). 
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Selection Methods for State Supreme Court Judges 
State	 Elected  or          Appointed 
Alabama Partisan election 
Alaska Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Arizona Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Arkansas Nonpartisan election 
California Gubernatorial appointment, with confirmation by commission 
on judicial appointments 
Colorado Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Connecticut Gubernatorial nomination from judicial selection commission, 
with legislative appointment 
Delaware Gubernatorial appointment from judicial nominating 
commission with senate consent 
District of Presidential appointment from judicial nomination 
Columbia commission, with senate confirmation 
Florida Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Georgia Nonpartisan election 
Hawaii Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
senate confirmation 
Idaho Nonpartisan election 
Illinois Partisan election 
Indiana Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Iowa Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission 
Kansas Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Kentucky Nonpartisan election 
Louisiana Partisan election 
Maine Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation 
Maryland Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
senate confirmation 
Massachusetts Gubernatorial appointment with approval of governor’s council 
Michigan	 Partisan nomination 
for nonpartisan
election 
Minnesota Nonpartisan election 
Mississippi Nonpartisan election 
Missouri Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Montana Nonpartisan election 
Nebraska Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Nevada Nonpartisan election 
New Hampshire Gubernatorial nomination from selection commission 
recommendation, with appointment by the executive council 
New Jersey Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation 
New Mexico Partisan election 
New York Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
senate consent 
North Carolina Nonpartisan election 
North Dakota Nonpartisan election 
continues 
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Selection Methods for State Supreme Court Judges (continuation) 
State Elected  or          Appointed 
Ohio Partisan primary for
nonpartisan general 
election 
Oklahoma Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission 
Oregon Nonpartisan election 
Pennsylvania Partisan election 
Rhode Island Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
house and senate confirmation 
South Carolina Legislative election 
South Dakota Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Tennessee Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
Texas Partisan election 
Utah Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
senate confirmation 
Vermont Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with 
senate confirmation 
Virginia Legislative election 
Washington Nonpartisan election 
West Virginia Partisan election 
Wisconsin Nonpartisan election 
Wyoming Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission 
New York created a “non-partisan” Judicial Nominations Commission consisting of twelve 
members: four are appointed by the governor, four by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, 
one each by the Legislative Assembly’s Speaker and Minority Leader, and one each by the Senate 
President and Minority Leader. The four appointed by the Governor and Chief Judge must be 
split along party lines and include two non-lawyers.67 The Commission is charged with prepar-
ing a list of persons who are “well qualified” for an opening on the Court of Appeals.68 This list 
must be between three and seven candidates for a single vacancy.69 Once this work is completed, 
the Governor may appoint, with the “advice and consent” of the state Senate,” a person from 
among the names given.70 
The New York Constitution requires that any appointee have practiced in New York for 
at least ten years and been admitted to the N.Y. Bar for at least five years. It leaves further 
qualifications to the Legislature.71 New York’s Judiciary Law obligates the Commission to select 
candidates who “by their character, temperament, professional aptitude and experience are well 
qualified to hold such judicial office.”72 
67 N.Y. Const. art. VI § 2d(1).
 
68 Id. art. VI § 2d(4).
 
69 N.Y. Judiciary Law art. 3-A  §63(2)(b), (3).
 
70 N.Y. Const. art. VI §2e.
 
71 Id. art. VI § 20a, c.
 
72 N.Y. Judiciary Law art. 3-A §63(1).
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There is no formal retention process. Judges’ terms are for fourteen years. They must apply 
to be reappointed. The reappointment process is identical to the original appointment: essen-
tially the judge goes through the full process again. 
There have been some complaints that the Nominations Committee process has failed to 
produce better candidates. Nominations have largely come from the ranks of New York’s lower 
courts (which are still popularly elected), meaning that candidates maintain partisan affilia-
tions. Another concern has been that the number of qualified applicants to be Court of Appeals 
justices has fallen significantly. This has been largely attributable to the huge disparity between 
the relative low pay for a Court of Appeals judge compared to the lucrative practice of private 
law in NY,73 but has also been said to be, in part, “because it appeared that only a couple of can-
didates with close connections to the [Governor’s] administration had any real chance of being 
selected.”74 
Court of Appeals judges must retire at age 70 but can serve out their 70th year if their term 
has not yet expired. There is pending legislation to increase the mandatory retirement age to 80 
in recognition of increasing life spans and mental competency, as well as the difficulty New York 
has experienced in finding qualified candidates, willing to serve. There are also efforts being 
made to increase the pay of New York judges generally to be sure that New York maintains its 
stature as a leader in the quality of its judiciary.  
2. Arizona 
Like New York, Arizona for many years had a popularly elected judiciary. In 1974, Arizona im-
plemented a merit selection system, with retention elections every two years. This new system 
is predicated on the belief that popular elections were overly politicizing the judicial branch. 
The merit retention system still had a public election component, ostensibly informed by a poll 
of Arizona lawyers, run by the state government. Each member of the Arizona Bar Association 
was supposed to rate prospective judges based on their age, health, judicial integrity and compe-
tence in various areas of the law, with a recommendation on retention or nonrenewal. This sys-
tem proved unpopular. Not all lawyers would fill out the questionnaires. The polls became more 
about politics and connections than judicial temperament, competence and independence. Fur-
ther, the public was not well informed of the results of the lawyers’ ratings. 
A 1989 task force on Arizona’s courts concluded that “most voters never learn the results of 
the bar poll” and, given the widespread public distrust of the Bar Association, those that did pay 
attention declined to take the poll results seriously.75 As a result, not a single judge lost a reten-
tion election for the eighteen years between 1974 and 1992. In 1988, based on these complaints, 
the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court appointed a commission to make recommenda-
tions, resulting in the system in place today. 
73	 John Caher, Assembly Bill Would Raise Retirement Age for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2013, available at http:// 
www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202590476464&Assembly_Bill_Would_Raise_Re-
tirement_Age_for_Judges&slreturn=20130316181407. 
74 John Caher, Read Tapped for Court of Appeals, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 2003, at 4. 

75 John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects and Concerns, 30 Ariz. St., 

L.J. 643, 655 (1998). 
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Arizona (like New York) now uses a nominating commission to select its Supreme Court 
judges. The Arizona Nominating Commission is headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. It includes five attorney members, chosen by the state Bar Association, and 10 non-attor-
ney members appointed by the Governor “with the advice and consent of the [Arizona] Senate.” 
Membership must be evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. The Commission con-
stantly rotates, with members serving staggered four-year terms.76 
When there is a vacancy on the Arizona Supreme Court, the Commission submits a list of 
at least three names (with people from both political parties) to the Governor. The Governor 
is empowered to appoint a Justice within 60 days (after 60 days, the Chief Justice may choose 
between the nominees on the basis of merit alone).77 
Arizona then requires the justice to run in an election after the first two years in office, and 
again every six years thereafter, to continue to serve. The justices do not face any opposition; 
voters choose only whether to retain individual judges. Any resulting vacancies are filled by the 
process described above.78 
Arizona implemented a system for assessing judicial performance to give the public “a full 
and fair opportunity for participation in the evaluation process through public hearings, dis-
semination of evaluation reports to voters and any other methods as the court deems advis-
able.”79 To that end, the Supreme Court is authorized to appoint a total of thirty members to the 
Commission on Judicial Performance Review (“CJPR”), whose job it is to evaluate judges and 
disseminate that information. The Performance Commission conducts two evaluations in each 
judicial cycle, one midway through the judge’s term and again just before a retention election. 
The midway evaluation is given only to the judge and is designed to promote improvement; the 
retention evaluation is made public. To assemble this survey, the CJPR surveys both lawyers 
and non-lawyers who have appeared or otherwise interacted with the judge in question. Those 
surveys are collected and transcribed anonymously to form the written reports presented to the 
public. 80 
To be an Arizona Supreme Court justice, one must “be a person of good moral character 
and admitted to the practice of law in and a resident of the state of Arizona for ten years next 
preceding his taking office.”81 The goal of Arizona’s Nominating Commission is “to select judges 
who have outstanding professional competence and reputation and who are also sensitive to the 
needs of and held in high esteem by the communities they serve and who reflect, to the extent 
possible, the ethnic, racial and gender diversity of those communities.”82 Arizona (like 20 other 
states) requires its judges to retire at age 70. 
76	 Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 36(a-c). 
77	 Id. at  § 37. 
78	 Id. at § 38. 
79	 Id. at §6.42. 
80	 ASJ6, supra note 59, at 36-37. 
81	 Ariz. Const. art. 6. §6. 
82	 Arizona Judicial Branch, Judicial Nominating Commissions, Uniform Rule of Procedure 1, avail­
able athttp://www.azcourts.gov/jnc/UniformRulesofProcedure.aspx#RULE_1. 
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The main criticism of Arizona’s selection system is that neither the press nor the public have 
paid much attention, with the result that voting remains uninformed. The CJPR has “struggled 
to find the best distribution method for the results,” with only 30 percent of voters even knowing 
about the existence of the program. Voter apathy has made it difficult to attract high-quality 
judges. Arizona voters have retained multiple judges whose abilities were severely questioned 
by CJPR.83 
Notably, in the many states with similar retention by popular-election systems, very small 
fractions of judges facing a vote have lost their bid for retention.84 Indeed, the most remarkable 
fact about retention elections in the United States is that they are largely ignored. Between 1936 
and 2009, 637 state Supreme Court judges faced retention elections, with 629 being retained.85 
The few who were not retained lost their election largely because of “hot button” issues like 
abortion, gay marriage, or the death penalty.86 
B. Direct Elections of Justices 
1. Texas 
Texas, like many other states, elects its Supreme Court judges through partisan elections, with 
mandatory retirement at age 75. Texas Supreme Court judges must be U.S. citizens, residents of 
Texas, have practiced law for at least 10 years and be at least 35 years old.87 
Texas is unique in the U.S. in having two highest courts: the Court of Criminal Appeals, 
which handles all criminal matters, and a separate Supreme Court for all other matters. Judges 
for both courts are elected for six-year terms. The only exception to this comes when a vacancy 
occurs by retirement or otherwise, in which case the Texas Governor is authorized to appoint 
someone to fill the post, until the next statewide popular election occurs.88 
Texas’ partisan election system has been widely criticized. Rather than resulting in an inde-
pendent and responsive judiciary, the system has seen the cost of campaigns skyrocket, with “an 
increased focus on the players behind the scenes who paid for pricey campaigns.”89 As a leading
83	 ASJ6, supra note 59, at 39-41. 
84	 Albert J. Klumpp, Arizona Judicial Retention: Three Decades of Elections and Candidates, Ariz. Attorney, 
Nov. 2008, available at http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/1108election.pdf (in Missouri, 
only two judges have failed retention elections since 1948, and in Illinois less than 2% of judges have failed 
even since it raised the retention requirement to 60% of the vote). 
85	 Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges: Landmark Iowa Elections Send Tremor Through the Judicial Retention Sys­
tem, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2011), available at   http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/landmark_iowa_elec-
tions_send_tremor_through_judicial_retention_system/. 
86	 A.Z. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html; http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ar-
ticle/landmark_iowa_elections_send_tremor_through_judicial_retention_system/.  
87	 Tex. Const. art. V1-a, 2b-c. 
88	 Id. at 3-4, 28. 
89	 AJS6, supra note 59, at 2. 
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judicial elections authority has observed, “[T]he election of Texas Supreme Court justices [has] 
become a battleground for plaintiff and defense lawyers.”90 
All legislative efforts to move to a U.S. Supreme Court-type system have failed. One effort 
at reform was the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act (“JCFA”) of 1995.91 The JCFA passed a limit 
of $5,000, for both individuals and law firms, on donations to campaigns for a position on 
the Texas Supreme Court and imposed disclosure requirements for any organization spending 
more than $5000 in support of any candidate.92 The JCFA has reduced the total amount spent on 
elections in recent years, but “the perception that justice is for sale has lingered.”93 
2. Mississippi 
Mississippi selects its Supreme Court judges through a nonpartisan election process. Candi-
dates are precluded from affiliating themselves with any political party, either on the ballot or 
while campaigning. Although they hold office “from their state at large,” Mississippi Supreme 
Court judges are locally elected from three different geographic districts, for eight-year terms. 
Candidates must have practiced law and lived in Mississippi for at least five years, and be at least 
30 years of age. There is no mandatory retirement age.94 
Critics of nonpartisan elections have pointed out that, in the absence of any political party 
identification, there is generalized public apathy. Voters tend to focus on factors like the can-
didate’s race, gender, nickname and location on the ballot, with the result that special interests 
(like the personal injury trial lawyer’s associations) influence judicial races regardless of their 
claimed nonpartisan nature. Potential judges are all the more beholden to individual contribu-
tors and special interest groups, and even less independent.95 
Nonpartisan elections are described by one commentator as “possess[ing] all of the vices 
of partisan elections and none of the virtues.”96 Indeed, Mississippi has a widespread reputation 
for highly politicized rulings favoring the Mississippi personal injury lawyers who finance most 
judges’ elections.97 
It is significant that, in 1993, a Mississippi judicial-reform task force recommended that 
the state implement a nomination and confirmation process like that for U.S. Supreme Court.98 
90	 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges:  Is There One ‘Best’ Method? 23, Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1,26 
(1995), available at www.law.fsu.edu/journas/lareview/issues/231/webster.html.
91	 Tex El. Code Ann. Tit. 15, § 253.151. 
92	 Id. at §153.155, 163. 
93	 AJS6, supra note 59, at 8. 
94	 Miss. Const. art. 6 § 145, 149, 150. 
95	 AJS6, supra note 59, at 29. 
96	 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One ‘Best’ Method?, 23 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 26 (1995). 
97	 The Center for Public Integrity, Mississippi Judges, Attorney Appeal Bribery Convictions (Nov. 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.stateintegrity.org/mississippi. 
98	 Report of the Mississippi Bar’s Commission on the Courts in the 21st Century (1993) , available
at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/miscollr14&div=29&g_sent=1&collection=jour-
nals. 
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That proposal was rejected and the present Mississippi system implemented, based upon strong 
lobbying by the Mass Tort and Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs Lawyers Association. As a conse-
quence, Mississippi’s “reform” has not significantly altered the existing system, except that par-
tisan organizations like the Trial Lawyers’ Association have become more influential in judicial 
elections than they were before.99 
C. Legislative Appointment 
The South Carolina legislature (its General Assembly) has long been empowered to select the 
state’s Supreme Court judges. They are appointed for 10-year terms, subject to retirement at age 
72. Each 10 year term is considered separate; judges may apply for reappointment and there is 
no formal retention process. Judges must be U.S. citizens, at least 32 years old, been licensed 
as attorneys for at least eight years, and have been South Carolina residents for five or more 
years.100 
South Carolina’s current legislative appointment process is a response to many complaints 
in the 1990s that the state’s judicial system lacked any independence from the legislature, which 
was itself highly politicized and “inbred” (all the Supreme Court justices were former S.C. leg-
islators).101 Now, in making its appointments, the General Assembly is required to consult with 
three separate entities. The first, and most important, is the Judicial Merit Selection Commission 
(“JMSC”). The JMSC conducts the initial screening of Supreme Court candidates. The JMSC has 
10 members, five of whom are selected by the Speaker of the House, three of whom are appoint-
ed by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and two by the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate. Six members must be representatives, and four must be from the general public.102 
When a vacancy opens, the JMSC screens candidates and sends a list of nominees from 
which the General Assembly must choose. To do so, the Committee sends questionnaires to all 
members of the South Carolina Bar, interviews all candidates, and reviews their written state-
ments, published writings, and past records (including criminal and financial matters in addi-
tion to academic and any judicial histories). After reviewing these materials, the Committee 
holds public hearings on prospective judges’ qualifications.103 
The second body is the Citizens Committee on Judicial Qualifications (“CCJQ”). The CCJQ
is designed to increase public participation in the selection and retention of judges. Its stated goal
is for “all South Carolinians [to] have a voice in the selection of … judges.” The CCJQ is in fact
five different committees of ten people who are selected by the immediate past regional chairman.
Each committee picks its own regional chairman for each session. Each CCJQ reports on all can-
didates in its region, theoretically assisting the JMSC in its recommendation-making process.104 
99	 AJS6, supra note 59, at 31-32. 
100 S.C. Const. art. V §3, 15. 
101 See, e.g., Martin S. Driggers, Note, i, 49 S.C.L. REV. 1217, 1235 (1998). 
102 S.C. Code L. § 2-19-10. 
103	 JMSC Process Overview at www.scstatehouse.gov/html-pages/judmerit.php (overview on the Judicial 
screening process). 
104 See, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/CitizensCommitteesOnJudicialQualificationsMis-
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The third entity involved is the South Carolina Bar Association’s Judicial Qualifications 
Committee. That Committee produces biannual reports rating all candidates, based on inter-
views with lawyers and others who have interacted with the candidates. The Committee rates 
each judge as well qualified, qualified or not qualified. The ratings are published on the Bar 
Association’s website.105 
The South Carolina legislative approach to judicial selection has been roundly criticized 
as assuring the politicization of judges and undermining their independence. The complicated 
overlay of the various consultative bodies has had no apparent positive effect. Some studies have 
commented upon the lack of quality and independence of South Carolina’s highest court, noting 
the S.C. Supreme Court’s disregard of politically unpopular (in South Carolina) U.S. Supreme 
Court precedents on due process and other issues.106 
Recent additional reforms have been proposed. The critics of the South Carolina appoint-
ment system note that “members of the legislature, many of whom are lawyers who may appear 
before that judge in the future, select and then fund the judiciary.” The critics say that this is “a 
clear violation of the three independent branches of government we all learned about in third 
grade.” The current proposal would have the Governor present three candidates, with the state 
Senate voting to select one of the three.107 
D. Gubernatorial Appointment with Legislative Confirmation 
1. California 
California is the United States’ largest and most economically important state. California has a 
complex process for appointing its Supreme Court Justices, with interactions amongst the state’s 
Governor, a Commission on Judicial Appointments, and California voters. The state adopted 
this system in 1934 after years of dissatisfaction with the quality of judges produced by partisan 
elections.108 
Judicial candidates must have been state bar members or judges for at least ten years. Su-
preme Court justices are initially appointed for 12-year terms, with retention elections at the 
expiration of a term. There is no competing opponent in any retention election. There is no 
mandatory retirement age in California. 
California’s Governor appoints justices of the Supreme Court but that decision is only ef-
fective when confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. The Commission is
sion&Rules5.12.11.pdf. 
105 See, http://ww2.scbar.org/public_services/judicial_surveys__reports/. 
106	 Kimberly C. Petillo, The Untouchables:  The Impact of South Carolina’s New Judicial Selection System on the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, 67 Albany L. Rev. 937, 938 (2004). 
107	 Bill Davis, Judging the Judges:  Who Should Have The Upperhand In Selecting Our Jurists?  Statehouse Report 
11.41, October 12, 2012 (www.statehousereport.com/currentissue.aspx?ID=205). 
108	 Deborah Kiley, Merit Selection of California Judges, (Mar. 2, 1999), available at  http://www.mcgeorge.edu/ 
Documents/Publications/ccglp_pubs_merit_selection_pdf.pdf 
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a three-person panel consisting of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the presiding 
judge who has served for the longest time on the state’s intermediate appellate courts.109 
In making a nomination, the Governor is guided by the recommendations of a Commis-
sion on Judicial Nominees Evaluation.110 That Commission is charged with “confidentially” in-
vestigating and evaluating judicial qualifications of candidates identified by the Governor. The 
Commission consists of 27 to 38 people, at least 80 percent of whom must be active members 
of the California Bar. Members are appointed by the Board of Trustees of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia. They may not endorse nor participate in any candidate’s retention campaigns, nor seek 
appointment themselves. 
In reviewing candidates, the Evaluation Commission considers an application for appoint-
ment from the Governor, past application materials, state bar records, and information from 
former colleagues, area attorneys and other knowledgeable parties, on the qualifications of each 
nominee. The Commission ranks candidates based on their qualifications, focusing on the attri-
butes of “collegiality, writing ability, scholarship, distinction in the profession, and breadth and 
depth of experience.” The Governor is not bound by these evaluations, but must at least consider 
their findings.111 
This process applies to two distinct vacancy situations. In one, a judge declines to seek re-
election at the expiration of his or her term. In that case, the Governor is charged with nominat-
ing someone to succeed the retiring judge. If selected, that person must then seek election in the 
next general election. In the second situation, a judge either vacates the position in the middle 
of the term (most often due to early retirement or death), or fails to win a retention election. If 
this occurs, the Governor may appoint a judge to fill the seat until the next general election.112 
2. New Jersey 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court model, New Jersey gives its Governor the power to appoint 
justices to the state’s Supreme Court, with the “advice and consent of the [New Jersey] Senate.” 
The New Jersey Constitution requires that all judges have been admitted to practice law in New 
Jersey for at least ten years prior to their appointment.113 
By executive order, the Governor appoints a Judicial Advisory Panel whose mission it is to 
“review the background and abilities of potential nominees to the judiciary.” The Panel consists 
of seven members, appointed by the Governor for five-year terms. Five or more of the Panel 
members must be retired judges. The Governor is expected to “rely heavily” on the Panel’s eval-
uations in making nominations for approval by the Senate.114 
109 Cal. Const. art. VI §7,§16(d)(2).
 
110 Cal. Gov. Code §12011.5h.
 
111 See, http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=49Aq1IKMz54%3d&tabid=1230  1, 2-3, 6.
 
112 Cal. Const. art. VI §16(c-d).
 
113 N.J. Const. art. VI §VI, ¶¶1-2. 

114 See, http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eojsc36.htm ¶¶ 1,5.
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The Senate in turn has the benefit of a formal oversight process provided by the New Jersey 
State Bar Association. According to a compact renewed with each Governor, the Bar Associa-
tion reviews the qualifications of candidates, confidentially reporting its findings to the Gover-
nor. This review is conducted by a twenty-six-member Judicial and Prosecutorial Appointments 
Committee. The motivation for this agreement was to encourage the nonpartisan vetting of 
candidates and to improve the quality of New Jersey’s judiciary.115 
The N.J. Bar has set forth the following criteria for a desirable judge: 
1.	 Undisputed integrity; 
2.	 A high degree of knowledge of established legal principles and procedures, and a high 
degree of ability to interpret and apply them to factual situations; 
3.	 That they have been a licensed attorney in New Jersey for at least 10 years; 
4.	 An appropriate judicial temperament, which includes common sense, compassion, 
decisiveness, firmness, humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact and understanding; 
5.	 A commitment to diligence, punctuality and effective management skills; 
6.	 The requisite physical and mental abilities to be able to perform the essential functions 
of the job; 
7.	 Demonstrated financial responsibility; and 
8.	 Demonstrated participation in public service activities.116 
Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed to initial seven-year terms. After that, they 
must go through the full nomination process, as described above, one time before being granted 
permanent appointments, “on good behavior,” subject to mandatory retirement at age 70. By 
tradition, honored by all Governors to date, three of the Supreme Court’s members must be 
from the Republican Party and three from the Democratic Party.117 
E. Lessons from the Individual U.S. States 
As demonstrated, various individual states in the United States have experimented with a num-
ber of different methods for selecting their highest court judges. It is instructive that the ap-
proaches deviating from the U.S. Supreme Court model (like in Texas, Mississippi and South 
Carolina) have been criticized for their ineffectiveness in producing greater independence, im-
partiality or overall quality in their respective judiciaries. And it is significant that states like 
New York and California have been gravitating back towards the U.S. Supreme Court process 
and balanced executive nomination with a legislative appointment approach, as adopted by 
New Jersey. 
115	 See, http://www.njsba.com/about/news-archives/state-bar-association-affirms-judicial-compact.html;
http://www.njsba.com/about/standing-committees/judicial-and-prosecutorial-appointments-commit-
tee.html.
116	 Susan A. Feeney, N.J. Bar Association plays Key Role in Reviewing Judicial Candidates, N.J. Blog, Feb. 16, 
2012 8:09 a.m.), http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2012/02/nj_bar_association_plays_key_r.html. 
117 See, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NJ. 
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The popular-election and legislative-appointment models of Texas and South Carolina, re-
spectively, have been consistently found to politicize the judiciary. In some instances the line 
between politicization and corruption is blurred, as demonstrated by the recent case of a Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court Justice who was convicted of corruption by a jury for ordering her staff 
to work on her electoral campaign.118 
The various nominating commissions that have been created by California and New York 
add complexity without necessarily enhancing the quality of the judiciary, or the transparency 
of the process. If anything, it dilutes press and public interest based on its complexity and the 
(false) appearance that “the professional experts” are protecting the public interest. 
As we saw in the discussion on the U.S. Supreme Court process, meaningful transparency 
is the product of an interested populace and an active free press. That assures an open airing 
of multiple perspectives and promotes the essential element for successful implementation of 
the rule of law: the public’s awareness of the importance to the society of who is selected and 
retained—and why—to be the ultimate arbiters of how a nation’s laws are to be interpreted and 
enforced. 
As noted before, that is an evolutionary development requiring active promotion by the 
press and educators at all levels of the school system, from early grade school through law and 
other graduate schools. It is, in reality and of necessity, a bottom-up process based on the cit-
izenry’s self-interest in greater individual and economic freedom. The press and public must 
demand, at the ballot box and otherwise, that the nation’s government itself become committed 
to the rule of law, with due process for all. 
118	 Matt Fair, Pa. Supreme Court Justice Convicted of Corruption, Law360, Feb. 21, 2013, available at http:// 
www.law360.com/competition/articles/417521?nl_pk=167e57cf-8e3e-4de0-bea8-8be66ad152a7&utm_ 
source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=competition. 
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III. Selected International Processes
 
Many different approaches to the selection and appointment of Supreme Court justices exist around the rest of the world. The following is a sampling of differing systems that have evolved in Europe and Asia.
A. Japan 
The Japanese Supreme Court itself selects and promotes future judges. While at first it seems 
that such a system would be insulated from political influence (that was in fact the intent when 
the system was adopted after World War II), this has not been the result.119 
Many scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court of Japan uses its administrative pow-
ers to further the political agenda of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, resulting in a stag-
nation of the legal system.120 The Supreme Court almost never overrules governmental determi-
nations, consistently deferring to the actions of the ruling party. Since its creation over seventy 
years ago, the Supreme Court has only struck down eight statutes on constitutional grounds.121 
The Liberal Democratic Party took power nearly half a century ago. It has a firm hold on 
who is a part of (and is promoted within) the judicial system. The highest ranks of the judiciary 
are made up entirely of those who support the party’s conservative political ideology. As party 
members are the ones who select candidates for promotion within the judicial system, the sys-
tem is self perpetuating, with no transparency.122 
This has been the case since the early 1970s. Back then a “young” liberal judge ruled that a 
government-proposed military facility could not be built on forest land because the existence of 
the military was unconstitutional. The judge disclosed that he had received a letter from a high-
er-ranking judge suggesting that it would be wiser to rule for the government. The legislative 
committee to impeach judges promptly convened, resulting in the junior judge’s reprimand for 
disclosing the letter and the senior judge’s complete exoneration. Shortly thereafter, many liberal 
judges resigned under pressure from senior judges, with the Supreme Court denying appoint-
ments to several members of a liberal political party.123 
Thus while in theory there are seats on the Supreme Court reserved for less-conservative 
members of the bar, these seats are typically not filled by liberal candidates. Even if a liberal 
judge reaches the Supreme Court, that judge is certain to be outvoted on every issue.124 
119 David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1545, 1545-47 
(2009). 
120 Daniel H. Foote, The Supreme Court and the Push for Transparency in Lower Court Appointments in Japan, 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1745, 1745 (2011). 
121 Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1713-18 (2011). 
122 Law, supra note 119, at 1545-47, 1560. 
123 Repeta, supra note 121, at 1724-34. 
124 Law, supra note 119, at 1564-68; Repeta, supra note 121, at 1713-14, 1574. 
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There have been calls for reform of the Japanese judicial appointment system. Over a decade 
ago, the government created the Judicial System Reform Council to examine the effectiveness 
of Japan’s judicial system. The Council found that “the processes for nomination by the Cabinet 
and for appointment are not necessarily transparent, and problems have been pointed out, such 
as the entrenchment of fixed proportions for the numbers of justices who come from each field.” 
Given the importance of Supreme Court judges, it recommended that “appropriate measures… 
be considered to secure a transparent and objective process for their appointment.”125 
That report did prompt a change in the system for appointing lower-court judges. In 2003, 
the Japanese Supreme Court established a Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Com-
mission, composed of non-current judiciary members, to review candidates for appointment as 
lower-court judges. The minutes of the selection meetings are made public. While this would 
seem to be an improvement in transparency, this has not been the case.  The reports are short, 
largely formulaic, with no statement of the reasons for selections or denials of appointments, 
beyond qualified or not. And, again, the Commission is dominated by Liberal Democratic Party 
members.126 
The stated selection criteria for new judges (and for reappointment) include law school 
grades, recommendations from law professors (by tradition, retired former judges), opinions of 
the chief judge where the candidate has worked, and softer personality traits like “cautiousness.” 
There is no transparency; neither the public nor the press is given access to the decisionmaking 
process. Despite calls to make these standards clearer and more precise, the Committee has 
determined that confidentiality in the reasons for selection (or rejection) of candidates is para-
mount, refusing to open up the process to public scrutiny.127 
The lesson from the Japanese approach is summed up well by one legal scholar’s observa-
tion: “There is no plausible way of designing or structuring a court so as to insulate it entirely 
from political influence.”128 
As discussed above, transparency is essential. It assures that competing ideologies have an 
opportunity to influence the process, with each side having an incentive to be a watchdog to 
expose questions regarding the competence, independence, impartiality and judicial tempera-
ment of prospective Supreme Court justices. 
125	 SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL], SHIHŌ SEIDO 
KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI IKENSHO—21 SEIKI NO NIHON O SASAERU SHIHŌ SEIDO [RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL—A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY] (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report. 
html.
126 Foote, supra note 120, at 1748, 1754-58. 
127 Id.
128 Law, supra note 119, at 1546. 
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As noted already, transparency is most effective when there is press and public awareness 
of the importance to the economic success of the nation and the rights of its citizenry of having 
a system governed by the rule of law, enforced by competent and independent judges. Creating 
such a culture does not happen overnight, but rather is a process of educating the citizenry from 
an early age and fostering open political debate through demands for and a governmental com-
mitment to freedom of the press and speech. 
B. England 
The United Kingdom has a long-established judicial system that promotes the rule of law but 
(like Japan) England has long had an insular, non-public system of judicial appointments. Until 
recently, “the power to appoint judges . . . vested in the Lord Chancellor.”129 
The Lord Chancellor was appointed by Her (or His) Majesty, on the advice of the Prime 
Minister of England’s Parliament. The Lord Chancellor was both the head of the judiciary of 
England and the presiding officer of the House of Lords, the upper and Sovereign-appointed 
chamber of Parliament which had final say on all major legal and other matters.130  In decid-
ing whom to appoint to a vacant judicial post, the Lord Chancellor would use “stringent (but 
unstated) eligibility criteria and ‘secret soundings’—a process of anonymous consultation with 
unnamed sitting judges.”131 
Dissatisfaction with the Lord Chancellor’s control of the judiciary led to Parliament passing 
a comprehensive Constitutional Reform Act, in 2005.132 The Reform Act addressed two issues. 
First was the perceived need for a more independent judiciary. To that end, several structural 
reforms were enacted to create a clear separation of powers between the legislature and the 
judiciary. The Act established the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as the highest court, 
taking over the role of the House of Lords. The Act also designated the Lord Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court as the head of the judiciary—a position previously held by the Lord Chan-
cellor.133 The Supreme Court is composed of a president (the Chief Justice), a deputy president,
129	 Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons for American States?, 34 Ford.
Urb. L.J. 387, 387 (2006). 
130	 See The Lord Chancellor, UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/principal/ 
lord-chancellor/. 
131 Maute, supra note 129, at 389. 
132	 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom 4 (2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf.; see
also Monica A. Fennell, Emergent Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 279, 279-80 (2008). 
133	 Lord Chief Justice, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/ 
the-judiciary-in-detail/judicial+roles/judges/lord-chief-justice. As head of the judiciary, “[t]he Lord Chief 
Justice decides where judges sit, and the type of cases they hear.” How the judiciary is governed, Judicia-
ry of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/ 
how-the-judiciary-is-governed. 
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and ten justices.134 It is the final court of appeal for all civil cases in the UK and for all criminal 
cases in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.135 
Second, the 2005 Reform Act redesigned the process by which members of the judiciary are 
appointed. This change was prompted by the recognition that “the composition of the English 
bench is woefully unrepresentative of the nation’s population.” The Act “create[d] both an inde-
pendent body charged with judicial selection and an ombudsman to handle complaints about 
the appointments process.”136 The intent was to provide transparency and thereby “strengthen 
judicial independence by taking responsibility for selecting candidates . . . out of the hands of 
the Lord Chancellor and making the appointments process clearer and more accountable.”137 
The Reform Act created the Judicial Appointments Commission (the “JAC”), as an inde-
pendent, non-governmental institution. The JAC was intended to be “independent of political 
patronage.” It handles selection for the Supreme Court as well as about nine hundred judicial 
positions, including both full- and part-time lower-court appointments.138 
The JAC is composed of a chair and fourteen commissioners. The chair must be a lay per-
son. Of the 14 commissioners, five must be members of the judiciary, but a majority must be 
laypersons. Those five judicial members must come from all levels of the court system. Commis-
sioners serve initial terms of up to five years, with a maximum of 10 years’ service. Appointment 
to the JAC is formally made by the Sovereign on recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, but 
there are significant limitations on who may be chosen.139  “All are recruited and appointed 
through open competition with the exception of three judicial members who are selected by the 
Judges’ Council.”140 This open application process focuses on “selflessness, integrity, objectivity, 
accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership.”141 
The Reform Act also created a Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. The Om-
budsman is responsible for handling complaints about judicial appointments. He or she accepts 
written complaints, investigates and considers any issues, and is empowered to take appropriate 
action to rectify any problems.142 
The Reform Act mandates that, in selecting individuals to fill a vacant judicial post, the 
JAC’s decision must be solely on merit—no other consideration may be considered in appoint-
ing an applicant to the bench. The JAC has formally established a set of attributes it uses to as-
134 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, ¶¶ 23(2), 23(5), 23(6).
 
135 The Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/.
 
136 Maute, supra note 129, at 390, 393.
 
137 About the JAC, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm.
 
138 Maute, supra note 129, at 390, 410.
 
139 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 1, 2, 2.2(a), 2.2(c),, 2.4(3), 7(1)-7(3), 10(2)(a), 10(2)
 
(b), 13-14, 16. 
140 About the JAC, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm. 
141 Maute, supra note 129, at 412; see also Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 8-10. 
142 See Making a Complaint, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/com-
plaints.htm; Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman Homepage, Justice, http://www.justice.gov. 
uk/about/jaco. 
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JAC’s Considerations: 
• Intellectual Capacity 
• Personal Qualities 
• Ability to Understand and 
Deal Fairly with Litigants and 
Disputes 
• Authority 
• Communication Skills 
• Efficiency 
sess merit. These include intellectual capacity, personal 
qualities, an ability to understand and deal fairly with 
litigants and disputes, authority, communication skills, 
and efficiency.143 The Act further mandates that selec-
tion will only be made if the person is of good character. 
Finally, diversity on the bench is encouraged, subject to 
considerations of merit.144 
The appointment process varies slightly depending 
on whether the vacant post is at the Supreme Court or an 
inferior court. When a vacancy occurs at the Supreme 
Court, the Lord Chancellor must convene a selection 
commission. That commission consists of the president 
and deputy president of the Supreme Court, one member of the JAC, one member of the Judicial 
Appointments Board for Scotland, and one member of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appoint-
ments Commission. The selection commission submits a report to the Lord Chancellor, making 
a recommendation which the Lord Chancellor may accept, reject, or require reconsideration of 
the nomination. Once the Lord Chancellor accepts a selection, he notifies the Prime Minister, 
who then recommends that nominee to the Sovereign for appointment (a mere formality). Se-
lection to fill the vacancy must be based on merit, and no person on the commission may be 
selected. A highly similar process is used in the selection of the Lord Chief Justice.145 
Appointees to the Supreme Court must have held high judicial office for at least two years 
or have held rights of audience as barristers at the higher courts of England, Scotland, or North-
ern Ireland for at least 15 years.146 “A judge of the Supreme Court holds that office during good 
behavior”147—that is, for life, subject to the requirement that all members of the judiciary leave 
the bench when they turn 70.148 The protection of tenure during good behavior is deemed im-
portant to independence as any legal professional “who has taken a salaried role will not be able 
to return to legal practice.”149 
143	 Qualities and Abilities, Judicial Appointment Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-pro-
cess/112.htm. 
144	  Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 63(2)-(3), 64(1)-(2). 
145	 Id. c. 4, sch. 8, pt. 3 §§ 29(2), 29(6), 26(3), 27(5), 27(7); c. 2, pt. 4 §§ 67-75. “Heads of Division” refers to the 
Master of the Rolls, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the President of the Family Division, and 
the Chancellor of the High Court. 
146	 Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, § 25. “High Judicial Office” includes seats on the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Northern Irish High Court, the Northern Irish High Court 
of Appeal, or the Scottish Court of Session. 
147 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 3 ¶ 33. 
148	 Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, pt. 26, § 1. However, if the “appropriate Minister” (most 
likely the Lord Chancellor, though the statute does not specify) finds that it is in the public interest for the 
jurist to continue in office after age seventy, he may authorize the person to continue to serve until the jurist 
is seventy-five. Id. § 5. 
149	 Becoming a judge, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judg-
es-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/judges-career-paths/becoming-a-judge.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic.rss. 
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Under U.K. law, a member of the judiciary may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from 
his or her post “[i]n cases where the judge’s conduct is seriously impugned.” A presiding judge 
may refer any such matter to the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor.” Those two officials 
“are jointly responsible for considering and determining complaints about the personal conduct
of all judges in England and Wales.”150 An Office for Judicial Complaints was created to “provide 
advice and assistance” to these two officials. 
The Lord Chief Justice (with the consent of the Lord Chancellor) has largely unfettered 
disciplinary powers, both formal and informal. He or she may speak to any member of the judi-
ciary informally.151 The Chief Justice also has the authority to “give a judicial office holder formal 
advice, or a formal warning or reprimand, for disciplinary purposes.” The Chief Justice may also 
“suspend a person from a judicial office for any period during which” the person “is subject to 
criminal proceedings,” “is serving a sentence imposed in criminal proceedings,” or “has been 
convicted of an offence and is subject to prescribed procedures in relation to the conduct con-
stituting the offence.”152 
The circumstances in which a judge may be removed are much more circumscribed. “Since 
the Act of Settlement it has only been possible to remove a senior judge from office through 
an Address to the Queen agreed by both Houses of Parliament.”153 The Lord Chief Justice and 
the Lord Chancellor do have the power to refer a judge to the Office for Judicial Complaints to 
assess whether removal is appropriate and recommend a course of action. However, the exercise 
of the removal power is exceedingly rare: it has never occurred in England and Wales and has 
been used only once, “when Sir Jonah Barrington was removed from office as a judge of the Irish 
High Court of Admiralty in 1830 for corruption.”154 
While the formal qualifications and appointment procedures discussed above are import-
ant to understanding how the UK courts select members of their judiciary, the practical effect 
of this system largely remains to be seen. The current system has only been in place since 2005. 
The Supreme Court and England’s other highest courts are still dominated by senior barristers 
known in British parlance as “Queen’s Counsel.”155 
Appointment as Queen’s Counsel is an honor attained by only about 150 lawyers per year 
and reserved for “the most elite group of senior” lawyers. Because an appointee to the Supreme 
150	 Judicial conduct, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-ju-
diciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/jud-conduct.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic&WBCMODE=PresentationUnpu. 
151	 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 108(3) (“[B]ut this section does not restrict what he may do infor-
mally or for other purposes or where any advice or warning is not addressed to a particular office holder.”). 
152	 Id. § 108(4), (6). Suspension differs from removal in that “[w]hile a person is suspended under this section 
from any office he may not perform any of the functions of the office (but his other rights as holder of the 
office are not affected).” Id. § 108(8). 
153	 Independence, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/ 
the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/independence. An address is roughly equivalent to an impeachment 
proceeding in the United States’ federal court system. See Senior Courts Act, 1981, ch. 54, pt. 1, § 11. 
154	 Judges and parliament, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judicia-
ry/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/judges-and-parliament. 
155	 See Maute, supra note 129, at 410-11 (“Because the JAC is new, there were not established procedure in place 
to select the first commissioners.”); id. at 419-22. 
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or any other English court may not return to private practice and the judges are paid substan-
tially less than the income of a successful barrister, judicial applicants tend to self-select for 
those who are in the later stages of their career. 
Thus, the English judiciary consists largely of older barristers who had successful private 
practices and have turned to the judiciary out of a sense of duty and the long-established tra-
dition of successful barristers “retiring” by becoming judges.156 As a consequence, the World 
Justice Project has observed, “While the court system is independent and free of undue influ-
ence, it is not as accessible and affordable as others in the region.”157 
The lesson from England for Latin America is the importance of avoiding the notion that 
the judiciary itself should appoint its successors in a non-transparent process. The British re-
forms expressly recognize that transparency is essential to a more open and independent judi-
ciary, one that is perceived as fair to the entire populace. 
C. Germany 
Germany, in contrast to the United States and other common law countries like Japan and En-
gland, has a civil law system. As a consequence, Germany relies on a combination of profession-
al, civil service judges and so-called “lay” judges (private citizens acting in a judicial capacity) 
for most legal disputes. Supervising these judges are numerous specialized courts of appeal fo-
cusing on different fields of law, with a Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
occupying the highest status, but tasked only with the narrow duty of judicial review of consti-
tutional matters.158 
“Specifically designated authorities” ask questions of the Constitutional Court, which ren-
ders final answers. The Court is formally detached from all three branches of the German gov-
ernment. The Constitutional Court provides “advisory opinions,” reviewing laws “in the ab-
stract” and, thus, “eliminate[ing] unconstitutional legislation and practices before they can do 
harm.” The metric against which laws are measured is the Basic Rights of the Federal Constitu-
tion.159 
The jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court is invoked in three ways: 
■■ Constitutional Complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerden): “This is [a]n extraordinary rem-
156	 Queen’s Counsel in England and Wales, 2011-12, Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/ 
moj/queens-counsel-in-england-and-wales,-2011-12 (click “Queen’s Counsel statistics 1995-12” link). For 
a discussion of the selection procedure, see Background to QC Appointments, Queen’s Counsel Appoint-
ments, http://www.qcappointments.org/?page_id=36; Salary, Judiciary of England and Wales, http:// 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/terms-of-service/salary
(“[I]t is worth noting that a successful solicitor or barrister from a top firm or Chambers can earn many 
times more than even a senior judge.”). 
157 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 22. 
158	 German Judiciary Act, §5, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_drig/englisch_drig.htm-
l#p0009. 
159	 See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law 3 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1913658. 
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edy open to individual citizens. Any person (and to some extent also a private corpora-
tion) can petition the Constitutional Court directly and personally to declare a federal 
or state statute unconstitutional and void, to set aside an executive act or to reverse the 
decision of any other court, on the ground that the challenged act violates a right guar-
anteed to him in the Bill of Rights.” 
■■	 Requests by Ordinary Courts (konkrete Normenkontrollen): “Every court has the right 
and duty to pass on the constitutionality of an applicable statute, but it may only pro-
ceed to judgment forthwith if it comes to the conclusion that the statute is constitution-
al. Otherwise, it must, under express constitutional mandate, stay the proceedings and 
refer the issue to the Constitutional Court.” 
■■	 Petitions by the Federal Government, a state government (Land), or one-third of the 
membership of Parliament (Bundestag) to declare a federal or state statute unconstitu-
tional and void (abstrakte Normenkontrollen): “Decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court are binding on all other courts and government instrumentalities. Moreover, 
every decision reviewing the constitutionality of a statute has itself the force of statute 
and is published in the Official Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt).”160 
The Constitutional Court is divided into two “Senates,” each of which possesses a mutually
exclusive jurisdiction. Both the First and Second Senates have eight members, for a total of sixteen
on the Court. The Court’s president serves on one Senate while the vice president serves on the
other. The two-Senate system was instituted in response to a debate over whether the Court would
function primarily in a traditional legal capacity or if it would act in a more political role.161 
As originally conceived, the First Senate would review the constitutionality of laws and hear 
cases arising out of ordinary litigation, while the Second Senate would hear the more “political” 
cases and disputes between branches and levels of government. To distribute the caseload more 
evenly, however, much of the First Senate’s work was passed on to the Second Senate, blurring 
the line between the responsibilities of the two.162 
Appointment to the Constitutional Court is a confidential process. It is “highly politicized.”163 
Judges are appointed to the Court by the federal legislature. The two German legislative bodies
each elect half of the judges: the Bundestag (composed of members directly elected by the peo-
ple) and the Bundesrat (composed of members selected by state governments). In the case of the
160	 Wiltraut Rupp-Brünneck, Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 387, 389-92 
(1972) (“The question whether or not a statute is in accordance with the Constitution may theoretically arise 
in nearly all constitutional proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court. Practically it arises only in 
the following three [set forth in the text].”). 
161	 Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. Comp. L. 194, 197 (2009). 
162 Id. at 197-98. 
163	 Andreas Broscheid, I’m *shocked*: Politics even in German constitutional court appointments, Broscheid’s 
Notebook, July 27, 2008, available at http://brosch.blogspot.com/2008/07/im-shocked-politics-even-in-
german.html (“Since Germany is a code law country, judicial appointments generally follow a civil-service 
system and are less politicized than US appointments . . . . Appointments to the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court are different.”); see also Kommers & Russell, supra note 161, at 200. 
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Bundestag, the public election is indirect: the Bundestag selects 12 members to a Judicial Selection
Committee (“JSC”), and the JSC elects the judges. Election to the JSC is by proportional represen-
tation (i.e., by party and region). 
A judge must receive two-thirds of the votes (eight) to be elected. In the Bundesrat, judges 
are also elected by a two-thirds majority of the legislative body. Members vote based on a short 
list of potential nominees, which often includes members of the Bundesrat itself. The two bodies 
do coordinate, with the Bundesrat conferring with the JSC to avoid redundant efforts. The two 
chambers alternate between selecting the Court’s president and vice president.164 
Scholars have noted, “The two-thirds majority required to elect a Judge endows opposition 
parties in the JSC with considerable leverage over appointments to the Constitutional Court. 
Social and Christian Democrats are in a position to veto each other’s judicial nominees, and 
the Free Democratic and Green parties, when in coalition with one of the larger parties, have 
won seats for their nominees through intra-coalition bargaining. Compromise is a practical 
necessity.”165 
To be appointed to the German Constitutional Court, a prospective nominee must be forty 
years of age and eligible for election to the Bundestag. He or she also must be qualified to act 
as a judge pursuant to the Judges Act. If elected to the Constitutional Court, the judge must 
not simultaneously hold office in the executive or legislative branch of the federal or a state 
government, or work in any other professional occupation other than as a lecturer at a German 
college. Furthermore, three of the eight judges on each Senate must be elected from the federal 
judiciary.166 
Judges on the Constitutional Court serve for a maximum of twelve years. No re-election is 
allowed. And a judge must retire at 68, even if the full twelve-year term has not expired.167 
The selection of Constitutional Court judges is politically important. “The election of judg-
es to the Federal Constitutional Court . . . is accompanied by a high-profile press campaign, 
[with] the press as the fourth power trying to bring transparency into an obviously highly po-
litical process. It is not surprising to observe that usually the appointments run strictly along 
party-political lines.”168 
164	 Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, (hereinafter “BVerfGG”) §§ 5(1), 6(1), 
6(2), 6(5), 7. 9(1). (“Throughout this process, the commission [that creates the shortlist in the Bundesrat] 
coordinates its work with that of the JSC. It is important to avoid duplicate judicial selections, and the two 
chambers need to agree on the particular senate seats each is going to fill and which of these seats are to be 
filled with Justices recruited from the federal high courts.”). 
165	 Kommers & Russell, supra note 161, at 200 (“An advisory commission consisting of the state justice ministers 
prepares a short list of potentially electable nominees. The justice ministers on the commission, like certain 
state governors (Ministerpräsidenten) and members of the Bundestag’s JSC, are often themselves leading 
candidates for seats on the Constitutional Court. Informal agreements emerge from the commission’s pro-
ceedings, specifying which states shall choose prospective Justices and in what order.”). 
166	 BVerfGG, supra note 167, §§ 3(1), 3(3), 3(4), 2(3), 4(1)-(3), 19. Eligibility for election presupposes the right 
to vote, and eligibility can be taken away for various reason—such as being in prison for more than a year. 
167 Id. § 4(1)-(3). 
168 Volker G. Heinz, Speech before participants of the Australian Bar Association Conference 1998, The Ap-
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The transparency is, however, significantly limited by the “confidentiality rules in Germa-
ny [that] protect all judges from public scrutiny of their views.”169 Confidentiality has proven 
difficult to maintain, as evidenced by the failed nomination of Dr. Horst Dreier. Dreier was a 
noted scholar, nominated for the Court by the Social Democrats. As his nomination was being 
discussed, it was leaked. Having taken positions that angered both the right and left his nomina-
tion became controversial. (His support of pre-implantation genetic screening for artificial re-
production angered social conservatives while his support of “rescue torture” angered the left.) 
While the far-left Greens began the opposition, in the end the Christian Democrats opposed 
Dreier as well, and his nomination was rejected.170 
The Dreier incident prompted a discussion within Germany as to whether such political-
ly important decisions ought to be made in secret, along partisan-politics lines. While some 
favored more public debate over potential justices, most German scholars and former jurists 
preferred the present system.171 
A constitutional court like that in Germany has been a popular model for countries re-
cently adopting (or rewriting) their constitutions. This has been the case in post-Franco Spain, 
post-Communist Europe, South Africa, South Korea, and some countries in Latin America.172 
While ostensibly sympathetic to fundamental personal and institutional rights, the constitu-
tional court model has also proven attractive to authoritarian regimes such as in Egypt, where a 
constitutional court was established by former, recently deposed President Mubarak as a way to 
give one-party rule a veneer of legitimacy.173 
D. Italy 
Italy is another civil law system which (like Germany) has a Constitutional Court. Italy has two 
“highest” courts, with a Supreme Court of “Cassation” (for civil and penal matters) as well as the 
Constitutional Court. The Italian judiciary is comprised of career judges who advance through 
bureaucratic appointments with promotion based on a “global evaluation” by the Higher Coun-
cil of the Judiciary. The Council is responsible for the appointment of all judges in Italy at all 
levels.  It is composed of judges elected by the judicial profession (two-thirds) and lay members
pointment of Judges in Germany (July 7, 1998). 
169 Id. at 9. 
170	 See Broscheid, supra note 163; Dietmar Hipp, The Man Who Holds Europe’s Destiny in His Hands, Der 
Spiegel, Sept. 11, 2012, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/andreas-vosskuhle-has-
power-to-decide-europe-s-fate-a-855100-2.html; Ulf Gartzke, Germans Debate “Rescue Torture,” Weekly 
Standard, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2008/01/germans_ 
debate_rescue_torture.asp. 
171 Broscheid, supra note 163. 
172 Id. at 4. 
173	 Id. at 1 n. 2, 4. As of  2005, 62 percent of all systems of national constitutional review were of the Kelsenian 
(i.e., Austro-German) model. (“[T]he framers of new constitutions have been more attracted to the ‘central-
ized model’ of constitutional review, with a specialized [constitutional court] at its core, than to the ‘decen-
tralized (or American) model’ of judicial review exercised by the judiciary as a whole.”); see also Sweet, supra
note 162, at 5. 
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(one-third) appointed by Parliament.174 There are three ex officio members: the President of the 
Republic, the President of the Court of Cassation, and the Attorney General.175 
While the selection process is still dominated by members of the judiciary given their ma-
jority position on the Council, corruption scandals in the 1990s prompted a reform in 2002 that 
gave Parliament a greater role in the selection process.176 The complaint was that judges were 
never subject to any critical review by their peers on the Council, resulting in judges being pro-
moted pro forma.177 The 2002 reform reduced the number of Council members from 33 to 24 
and included Parliamentary appointments.178 
The Constitutional Court rules on questions of constitutional law, reviewing challenges to 
actions of the Italian Parliament, resolving disputes between bodies of government, and hearing 
any charges against the President of the Republic.  It has 15 members, five of whom are selected 
by the President, five of whom are selected by Parliament, and five of whom are selected by the 
Higher Council of the Judiciary from the professional judiciary. Members of the Court serve 
nine-year terms and cannot be re-elected.179
 The Supreme Court of Cassation serves as the court of last resort in civil and penal cases. 
It is restricted to errors of substantive law (errores in iudicando), errors of procedure (errores in 
procedendo), and “defects” or errors of reasoning (i.e., “lacking sufficient or [containing] con-
tradictory grounds”). The Cassation Court also has the authority to determine jurisdiction and 
competence (that is, which Italian court should hear the case). The Court is made up of mem-
bers of the professional judiciary, as selected by the Higher Council of the Judiciary.180 
Italian judges receive lifetime appointments, subject to mandatory retirement at 70. There 
is no special procedure for removal. Professional judges start as lowest-court judges at the be-
ginning of their professional careers, serving only as judges throughout their judicial tenure.181 
The Italian judiciary has a reputation for political corruption.182 The World Justice Project 
rates Italy lowest amongst the major European countries, noting that “corruption and impunity 
of government officials undermine the performance of state institutions,” and the justice system 
174	 Carlo Guarnieri, Justice and Politics: The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective, 4 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 241, 248 (1994). 
175	 Wim Voermans & Pim Albers, Councils for the Judiciary in EU Countries, European Comm’n for the Ef-
ficiency of Justice, Council of Europe 70 (2003), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/ 
textes/CouncilOfJusticeEurope_en.pdf. 
176 Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, John 
M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 444, University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 2008) at *6. 
177 Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law & Economics of Judicial Councils, 27 Berkeley J. 
Int’l L. 53, 76 (2009). 
178 Id. at 76-77. 
179	 Const. of Italy Dec. 22, 1947, art. 134, 135; see also Samuel A. Alito, An Introduction to the Italian Consti-
tutional Court (May 31, 1972) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Princeton University), available at www.princeton. 
edu/~mudd/news/Alito_thesis.pdf. 
180 Corte Supreme di Cassazione, Arte e Storia, www.cortedicassazione.it/Cassazione/ArteStoria/ArteStoria. 
asp. 
181 Voermans & Albers, supra note 175, at 65-66. 
182 Id. at 65. 
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is slow.183 The Global Competitiveness Report similarly notes Italy’s “high levels of corruption 
and organized crime and a perceived lack of independence within the judicial system.” Italy 
ranks 133rd (out of 142) for the efficiency of its legal framework for settling disputes, 126th for 
the ability to challenge governmental action, 127th for trust of government officials, and 119th 
in terms of favoritism to well connected firms and individuals.184 
E. China185 
The Chinese legal system is evolving in light of the many economic and legal reforms that 
the ruling Communist Party has been initiating as the Party seeks to have China become the 
world’s leading economy. As the World Justice Project observed, China has seen significant 
improvement in recent years. It “scores well on public safety, ranking thirty-second overall and 
fourth among its income peers,” and has a relatively effective and speedy judicial system. But 
the WJP also noted that “judicial independence is a concern,” “indicators of fundamental rights 
are weak,” and “[t]he criminal justice system is . . . compromised by political interference and 
violations of due process of law.”186 
Given its drive for economic development, China clearly recognizes the need to be per-
ceived as having a legal system that is governed by the rule of law, something that decidedly 
was not part of China’s history. In imperial China, judges had no independence. The Emperor 
had supreme authority in all affairs, including the administration of justice. Local officials were 
principally responsible for the routine duties of administration, such as the collection of taxes, 
but were also tasked with resolving legal disputes.187 
Efforts were made to establish an independent judiciary after the Emperor was overthrown 
with the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. The Provisional Constitution of the Re-
public established a Central Tribunal to exercise supreme judicial power over civil and criminal 
matters. The Tribunal’s judges were to be appointed by the interim president and the attorney 
general. The provisional government set forth qualifications for appointment as judges. But this 
Americanized system was never implemented. The reform efforts were disrupted by infighting 
among various regional warlords, the beginning of World War II, and the follow-on Chinese 
civil war that resulted in the formation of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong and 
the Chinese Communist Party, in 1949.188 
Following the Communist Party’s takeover, the Republic’s legal system was abolished. All 
judicial officers were dismissed in favor of a revolutionary regime. According to the theory of 
class struggle at that time, the existing judicial officers were considered “class enemies,” viewed 
183 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 26. 
184 GCR, supra at note 3, at 27, 393-400. 
185	 This section is gratefully acknowledged to be based on the legal research and observations of Qiang Zhou, 
Huiqiong Deng, and Congying Bai, Attorneys at Law and Partners, ZY Partners, Beijing, China. 
186 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 30. 
187	 See Mi Yong, Research on the Selection Measures of Judges 51-59 (April 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Jilin University). 
188 Id. 
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as “tools for repression of the people.” The Communist Party issued a directive called “Deter-
mining Principles of Justice in the Liberated Areas.”189  The directive resulted in what has been 
called “the age of the socialist legal system”—in essence, a time without any rule of law—with 
the seemingly endless political persecutions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.190 
Starting in 1976, the Communist Party began implementing the “Reform and Opening-up
Policy.” As part of that effort, the Party focused on the value, for successful economic develop-
ment, of a legal system that is perceived to respect the rule of law. In 1995, the Party enacted the
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Judges, establishing professional qualification for the
appointment of judges and creating the Supreme People’s Court. In 2001, the National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) revised the Judges Law to strengthen the professionalism and independence of
the judiciary, in part through the establishment of the NPC’s Standing Legal Affairs Committee.191 
The Judges Law set minimal qualifications relating to education and legal experience for 
judges of the Supreme People’s Court and lower levels of the judiciary. However, political cor-
rectness remains a core requirement: “[T]o have fine political and professional quality and to be 
good in conduct.”192 
To be on the Supreme People’s Court, a judge must have “at least eight years” of legal experi-
ence.193 All new judges for any court must pass a unified national judicial examination, although
previously appointed judges were exempted from that requirement. That means the Chinese judi-
ciary is still populated with many judges selected primarily by the Communist Party leaders based
on their political reliability and willingness to appease the Party and its government officials.194 
189	 The main contents of the directive provided that: (i) “The judicial work of the people … must be based on 
the new laws made by the people;” (ii) “Before the people’s new laws are released systematically, the judicial 
work shall be based upon the CPC’s policies and various guiding principles, laws, regulations and resolutions 
issued by the People’s Government and the People’s Liberation Army;” (iii) “The judiciaries shall always edu-
cate and reform the judicial officers by defying and criticizing … all anti-people laws and decrees of the capi-
talist countries, including European countries, the United States and Japan, and learning and understanding 
the view of the state, the view of laws and new-democratic policies, principles, laws, orders, regulations and 
resolutions reflecting the Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” 
190	 During the Cultural Revolution (1952-1976), knowledge of law was entirely secondary to having the proper 
socialist revolutionary consciousness and Communist Party affiliation in judicial appointments. Zhang Hua 
and Wang Li, Research on the Judge Selection System in China, 2004 Jinling Legal Rev. 149-50. 
191	 Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China, translation available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail. 
php?id=2692. 
192	 Article 9 of the Judges Law states: A judge must possess the following qualifications: (1) to be of the nation-
ality of the People’s Republic of China; (2) to have reached the age of 23; (3) to endorse the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China; (4) to have fine political and professional quality and to be good in conduct; 
(5) to be in good health; and (6) to have worked for at least two years in the case of graduates from law spe-
cialties of colleges or universities or from non-law specialties of colleges or universities but possessing the 
professional knowledge of law; or to have worked for at least one year in the case of Bachelors of Law; those 
who have Master’s Degree of Law or Doctor’s Degree of Law may be not subject to the abovementioned 
requirements for the number of years set for work. 
193	 Article 9 of The Interim Measures for Public Selection of Candidates to Newly Appointed Judges and Proc-
urators (2008). 
194 Song Jianchao and Fu Xiangbo, Explore the Judge Selection System with Chinese Characteristics, People’s Ct. 
Daily (July 11, 2005); Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Reform 456 (2nd ed. 2001). 
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The President of the Supreme People’s Court is selected (and can be removed) by the Na-
tional People’s Congress. Other judges of the People’s Court are appointed and removed by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, upon the recommendation of the Pres-
ident of the People’s Court. The presidents of the local people’s courts are selected and removed 
by the applicable local people’s congress.195 
In practice, the judges for all courts are determined by the parallel level of the Communist 
Party, with all appointments reviewed centrally by the Party’s Organization Department. Only 
candidates nominated by the Party may be submitted to Congress for election. The appointment 
of judges by the People’s Congress is a mere formality.196 
The Chinese Constitution provides that Congress has the power to supervise the courts.197 
The authority of the Supreme People’s Court is limited. The Court has no power to review the 
constitutionality or legality of actions by the government or the Communist Party.   Accord-
ingly, the basic function of judges is to adjudicate criminal matters and private civil disputes in 
accordance with the relevant laws. 
Even in the performance of these limited functions, the judiciary is effectively under the in-
fluence of the Communist Party and its appointed governmental officials.198 And this influence 
is regularly and actively exercised through Party “instructions,” including shielding the illegal 
or criminal acts of Party leaders.199 
In theory, judges cannot be arbitrarily removed. The Judges Law provides that “[j]udges 
shall enjoy the . . . right[] . . . to be not removed or demoted from the post or dismissed, and to be 
195 Judges Law, supra  note 191,  art. 11. 
196 Sun Jian, Establishment of Judge Selection and Appointment System, L. Sci. Magazine, Mar. 15, 2004. 
197	 The specific provisions of the Constitution are as follows: 
Article 3: All administrative, judicial and prosecutorial organs of the state are created by the people’s con-
gresses to which they are responsible and under whose supervision they operate. . . . 
Article 67: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress exercises the following functions and 
powers: . . . (6) [S]upervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme 
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; . . . 
Article 104: The standing committee of a local people’s congress at or above the county level discusses and 
decides on major issues in all fields of work in its administrative area; supervises the work of the people’s 
government, people’s court and people’s procuratorate at the corresponding level;. . . 
Article 128: The Supreme People’s Court is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee. Local people’s courts at different levels are responsible to the organs of state power which created 
them. 
198 See Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China 71 (2009). 
199	 See Guo Daohui, Enforce the Judicial Independence, and Contain the Judicial Corruption, 1 Legal Sci. (1999); 
Zhou Daoluan, A Critical Comment on Supervision in Specific Cases and Relevant Proposals, Research 
on the People’s Representative Congress, 2004/3. Chinese law explicitly requires that “the people’s courts 
should actively accept the supervision from the people’s congress, the political consultative conferences, 
the procuratorate, and the society.” “The people’s courts should actively obtain the support of various social 
sectors, and enhance the cooperation with them, so as to build a good external environment.” Opinions of 
Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of the National Television and Telephone Meeting of the Political and 
Judicial Work, Supreme People’s Court, December 24, 2009. See also Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Re­
form, Law Press 87 (2001). 
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not given a sanction, without statutory basis and without going through statutory procedures.” 
But in practice, there is a relatively simple process for dismissal. The Judges Law allows for 
removal if a judge is “determined to be incompetent in the post through appraisal” or “disqual-
ified from continuing to hold the post because of violation of discipline, law or commission of 
a crime.” These vague standards provide ample bases for removal if a judge crosses someone in 
power in the Communist Party. This problem is compounded by the fact that there is a system 
of “investigation against wrong judgments.” Under this system, a judge can, if he or she makes a 
“wrong” ruling, be sanctioned with penalties including a reduction of pay, disqualification from 
promotion, or demotion of or removal from office.200 
An additional deterrent to judicial independence is the relatively low pay for judges. Judges 
are paid like other government officials; they do not have a separate salary or benefit arrange-
ment. Although judges and government officials have had their salaries increased several times 
in recent years, compared with other professions (e.g., employees of state owned enterprises, 
university teachers, governmental departments like industry, commence, tax, and finance), 
their salaries are low.201 This has made it difficult to attract quality judges. Excellent law students 
do not want to become judges; good judges tend to leave the judiciary. As a consequence, the 
remaining judges are subject to economic as well as political corruption.202 
Judicial corruption is a recognized problem.203 A 2012 report, submitted to the People’s 
Congress and the Political Consultative Conference states that during 2011, “ the various courts 
have investigated 519 personnel who violated the discipline or the law, among whom 77 people 
were prosecuted due to corruption, bribery or abuse of law during adjudication[.]”  The general 
perception is that the actual number of judges involved in judicial corruption far exceeds the 
data release by the Chinese government.204 
The Chinese Communist Party has declared that a “central [political] task” is to “rule the 
country by law, implement the law for the people, fair and just, [provide] service to the mac-
ro-society, and stick to the party’s leadership.” In December 2007, Hu Jintao, the secretary of 
the Communist Party, explained that judicial personnel should “stick to the supremacy of the 
Party’s cause, supremacy of the people’s interest, and supremacy of the constitution and law, so 
as to undertake the historical mission and political task of leading the vast judges, prosecutors 
200	 Judges Law, supra note 191, art. 83, 13; see also Li Xuli, A Comparative Research on the Job Security Sys­
tem for Chinese and Foreign Judges, Chinese Jurisprudence Net, http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.as-
p?id=16146. 
201	 See Zhou Changzhu, Discussion on the Relationship between Judges’ Welfare Security and the Construction of 
Modern Country Ruled by Law, Research Center for Government By Law,  http://law.china.cn/book/ 
txt/2007-12/17/content_1953060.htm. 
202	 See Su Li, Review of the Judges Selection System, 3 Jurisprudence (2004); Zhou Changzhu, Discussion on the
Relationship between Judges’ Welfare Security and the Construction of Modern Country Ruled by Law, http:// 
law.china.cn; Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Reform, Law Press 478 (2001); Xiao Yang, The System Con­
struction and Improvement Is a Guaranty of the Judges’ Team Construction, People’s Justice, 1998/5. 
203	 Eric Chi-yeung Ip, Judicial Corruption and its Threats to National Governance in China, 7 J.
Admin. & Gov. 80 (2012). 
204	 Yu Xiaopei, Discussion on Prevention of Judicial Corruption (Chinese), http://srzy.chinacourt.org/public/ 
detail.php?id=619. 
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and other personnel to safeguard the scientific development and promote social harmony.”205 
The President of the Supreme People’s Court, Wang Shengjun, has advanced the notion 
of “active adjudication.” While suggesting independence, the reality is that the interests of the 
Communist Party trump “the people’s interest.”206 
In sum, notwithstanding China’s economic success, the country’s actual legal system pro-
vides no new lessons for countries in deciding how best to promote the rule of law. China’s 
economic success has been admirable but, if anything, its growth has been hampered by the 
general perception — inside and outside of China — that its judiciary presently has limited to 
no independence from the Communist Party.207 
F.  International Lessons 
The central lesson from these other countries is the recognition that promoting a more effective 
operation of the rule of law is a goal for all of them, including China.  Each nation has its pecu-
liar cultural traditions and legal history that has produced the structure and actual operation of 
their respective legal systems. Few countries replicate the deference to authority and ancestry in 
Japan, the rigid discipline of the Germans or the fragmentation and pervasive societal corrup-
tion of Italy. That said, England’s willingness to undertake substantial, recent reforms in the in-
terest of making its judicial system a more modern representation of the entire British populace 
is instructive.  It demonstrates that other countries can and should consider their own efforts to 
enhance the operation of the rule of law through processes for the selection and appointment of 
more qualified, independent, impartial and societally diverse judges, committed to due process 
for all.  
205 Id. 
206	 He Weifang, Among the Three Supremacies, Which One Is Really Supreme, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/ 
blog_488663200100atga.html; Theoretic Study on Further Deepening the Guiding Thinking of “Three Su-
premacies”, available at http://old.chinacourt.org/html/article/200906/26/362750.shtml. 
207 WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 30. 
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IV. Conclusions 

The overall well-being and happiness of a country’s citizenry is directly affected by the degree to which the nation operates by the rule of law. That requires enforcement by an independent judiciary. How judges are selected and appointed is critical to achieving the 
judicial independence that is needed for the rule of law, with due process for all, to prevail over 
the inevitable efforts at political influence and economic corruption. 
The quality and independence of the judges selected for and appointed to a nation’s Su-
preme Court sets the tone for the overall quality and independence of a country’s judicial sys-
tem as a whole. Therefore, this paper has focused on how Supreme Court justices are selected 
and appointed in a representative cross-section of nations around the world and how the differ-
ing approaches have impacted the relative independence of their respective judiciaries and their 
willingness and ability to enforce the rule of law. Based on that analysis and as further detailed 
below, we recommend a transparent and merit-based system for the appointment of Supreme 
Court justices for all nations. 
As explained above and further emphasized below, transparency can only be achieved 
through the evolution of an active free press and an interested citizenry. The press and the peo-
ple must have the capacity and courage to demand freedom of speech and individual liberties, 
including the right to be governed by a legal system based on the rule of law, with due process 
for all, enforced by independent and impartial judges. That requires continuous education of 
the populace from an early age, on the importance to the nation and its citizens of the rule 
of law and the protection of everyone’s human rights. The path to progress requires an active 
commitment by the press, educators and academics to carry the message to the public, so that 
the citizenry can be motivated to demand that the governing political powers accept the need 
themselves to commit (and submit) to the rule of law.  
A. A Checks and Balances Process for Selection and Approval 
The approach taken in the Unites States (and other nations)—of nomination by a democrati-
cally elected executive, with final approval by an elected legislature through hearings open to 
the press and public—has, in the United States, proven superior to the other alternatives of 
nominating committees, popular elections and executive/legislative or judiciary-only appoint-
ments. The states of California, New York, New Jersey, as well as England, have been gravitating 
towards the executive/legislative model. 
The U.S. experience demonstrates that the time required for the executive/legislative, 
checks-and-balances approach allows an intense media focus on the selection and appointment 
processes, with a roadmap that can be readily explained to and understood by the general pop-
ulace. The duration and recognized importance of the process promotes awareness, interest and 
transparency. 
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This method avoids the complexity of nominating committees, whether comprised of pro-
fessional lawyers, other judges, or government officials, who themselves must be selected and 
appointed. In Arizona, nominating committees have been shown to diminish public and press 
interest in the process of selecting and approving Supreme Court justices because of the (too 
often false) appearance that “independent experts” are protecting the public’s interest. In Japan 
and England, allowing existing judges to select their successors has resulted in less dynamic and 
representative judiciaries. 
Press and other media attention on the selection and appointment process enhances public 
awareness of the importance to a nation and its populace of who is allowed to serve on the coun-
try’s Supreme Court. Both the executive and the legislature can—and should—be encouraged to 
solicit the views of the nation’s bar association, legal scholars and others (as is done in the United 
States and elsewhere as shown above). Media and the critically necessary public interest in the 
process provide a potential discipline upon the decisionmakers, enhancing the likelihood that 
more competent, qualified, independent and impartial Supreme Court justices will be selected 
and appointed, or the decisionmakers may face an adverse reaction from the public, at the ballot 
box or otherwise. 
In the U.S., the checks and balances approach applied in the selection of the U.S. Supreme 
Court has proven more effective in promoting public interest and media focus than the popular 
election of judges, as seen in Texas and Mississippi. Judicial elections may appear appealing as a 
nation moves from an authoritarian to a more democratic government, with popular elections. 
But as seen from the experience in those states in the U.S. which have experimented with (and 
in several, like California and New York, abandoned) popular elections, the elected-judiciary 
approach has proven ineffective in achieving the press and public attention that is critical to the 
success of the process. Furthermore, the need to raise money for elections has been a source of 
corruption and politicization. It has also diminished the likelihood that the most qualified and 
competent people are willing to serve as Supreme Court justices. 
Solely executive (effectively China) or legislative appointments (South Carolina) of justices 
have similarly proven to be less effective to safeguard judicial independence and the quality 
of judges. Solitary control diminishes the likelihood of close press or public scrutiny, and it 
enhances the probability of the politicization of the justices. That diminishes the likelihood of 
judicial independence, particularly as to any review of executive or legislative action. An ability 
and willingness of the judiciary to act as a check on inappropriate, unfair or corrupt governmen-
tal action is an essential element of an effective rule of law system. 
An important caveat is that the structure of the selection process cannot itself assure that a 
nation’s Supreme Court will have the type of qualified, competent, independent and impartial 
justices that will enforce the rule of law. As explained below, there are a number of other fac-
tors that are critical to having an effective judicial system, the most essential of which is public 
awareness of the importance to the nation’s success—and the well-being and happiness of its 
citizenry—of having the types of Supreme Court justices who can and will enforce the rule of 
law, with due process for all. 
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To that end, the people of a nation must be vocal—in public debate and at the ballot box— 
about their demand both for competent candidates, with the right qualities, and for transparen-
cy in the selection and appointment process. An active free press is essential to public awareness 
and interest. All of this is best promoted by education from an early age on the value to the 
nation and its citizenry of an independent judiciary. 
In short, a bottom-up movement fostered by the press, educators and academics is the sur-
est path to progress. 
B. Life Tenure, with Mandatory Retirement and Circumscribed 
Rights of Removal 
Experience has shown that independence, and the ability to attract and retain more qualified 
Supreme Court justices, is enhanced by lifetime appointments. Life tenure prevents the need 
for a justice to consider the implications of his or her present rulings on reappointment (or 
election), or the ability to obtain a legal or other position at the end of his or her term of office. 
Lifetime appointments have the additional benefit of assuring that the Court will have justices 
with greater judicial experience and, arguably, more competence in dealing with the types of 
important and complex issues that must routinely be resolved by a nation’s highest court. 
The criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s lifetime appointment system—that allows poten-
tially senile judges to stay on until a politically opportune time to resign—can be avoided by a 
mandatory retirement age. Many states in the U.S. and many nations have mandatory retire-
ment ages. Given increased longevity and the desirability for longer tenures, a mandatory retire-
ment age—of no more than 80 (as recently proposed for New York) and no less than 70—would 
be appropriate to balance the competing interests of competency and predictable turnover. A 
specific benefit of a mandatory retirement age is that it allows the press and public to focus at-
tention on potential appointees (and their respective merits) in the time immediately before a 
justice is known to have to resign because of age. 
Of course, there must always be a process for removal of a Supreme Court justice. But the 
threat of removal should be narrowly circumscribed to conduct detrimental to the indepen-
dence and integrity of the Court itself, e.g., evidence of corruption, mental incapacity, crimi-
nal misconduct, and the like. The process for removal should mirror the process for approval, 
meaning that a justice should not be removed without having the due process of open hearings 
before the legislative body that confirmed him or her, on any claimed grounds for removal. 
Impeachment should require a two-thirds majority vote, to deter ready resort to the removal 
process for political dissatisfaction 
C. Supreme Court Justices’ Pay Should Be Meaningful and 
Protected 
As seen in New York, a judicial salary of sufficient magnitude to attract qualified candidates 
should be guaranteed. There should be no ability of the executive or legislature to manipulate 
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(other than by periodic increases). Such protected pay has proven to be a further stimulus to the 
independence of the judiciary. The fact of life tenure and the societal stature of being a Supreme 
Court justice should mean that the pay can be well below what is obtainable in private practice. 
Having the pay scale continue (like a pension) after retirement would have the further effect 
of allowing resignations, e.g., for poor health, prior to the mandatory retirement age. The right 
to continued pay should cease if a retired justice enters private practice or some other govern-
ment or regularly remunerative position. 
D. A Reasonable, Uneven Number of Justices 
It is important to allow the multiplicity of viewpoints in a Supreme Court. Experience has taught 
that this leads to the best quality of thoughtful decisionmaking. However, too large a number of 
justices make deliberations to decide a matter, cumbersome and inefficient. An uneven number 
is advisable to allow a majority decision in most cases. There is no “right” number but nine jus-
tices (like for the U.S. Supreme Court) has seemed to be a good balance. 
E. Qualifications to Be a Supreme Court Justice
The quality of the justices appointed to a nation’s Supreme Court is the ultimate determinant of 
its independence and commitment to the rule of law. We believe that, in order to be appointed 
a justice, a candidate should have the following qualifications: 
1. Independence and impartiality: a judicial temperament 
The foundation for a successfully functioning Supreme Court is the impartiality and indepen-
dence of its members. In other words, judges should not be influenced by interests beyond the 
law. This is an important guarantee that their decisions will be based solely on legal consider-
ations. Impartiality and independence require a judicial temperament, the ability and willing-
ness to engage in thoughtful, open-minded analysis and collegial deliberations before reaching 
a final determination. 
Justices should not only be independent and impartial but should also be seen as being in-
dependent and impartial. Candidates should not have any political or economic commitments 
which may suggest that they lack this quality. To test the question of actual and likely future 
independence and impartiality, it is recommended that all candidates be required to furnish a 
sworn statement containing a comprehensive list of clients, contractors, former work and pro-
fessional colleagues, as well as business and professional entities in which they have a stake or 
have been involved with in the past. That statement should be timely available to the press and 
public and should be assessed thoroughly in the open hearings about the candidate’s qualifica-
tions for approval as a justice. 
2. Reputable conduct and spotless record of integrity 
A spotless record of conduct and a reputation for personal integrity are important factors for 
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promoting respect for and confidence in a justice’s commitment to the rule of law. Moreover, 
morally or ethically improper conduct, beyond discrediting a justice’s personal reputation and 
that of the Court generally, could render a justice more vulnerable to improper influence. 
As part of the overall assessment process, a candidate’s work and other references should 
be checked thoroughly. The person should not have been sanctioned by a court or an ethics 
committee of a bar or other organization. The public hearing should examine these issues, as 
well as any observations or challenges made by citizens. All allegations of misconduct should be 
investigated and taken into account when assessing a candidate’s appropriateness to be a justice. 
3.	 Outstanding knowledge of the law and legal analysis 
Another fundamental characteristic of a Supreme Court justice should be his or her legal 
knowledge and experience. The importance and complexity of cases coming before a Supreme 
Court means that its justices should have an excellent history of understanding and assessing 
legal issues. This suggests that the best candidates are judges on the nation’s lower courts, with 
proven experience in making independent and impartial judgments on important and complex 
legal questions. 
Consideration should also be given to: 
■■	 The academic education of the candidate; 
■■	 The publication of legal articles or books which have received positive peer reviews 
(i.e., publications that have been recognized as being important contributions to legal 
debate); 
■■	 Academic or professional lectures on legal issues; 
■■	 Public recognition as a legal expert (i.e., he or she has been a resource person for na-
tional and international entities); 
■■	 The candidate’s experience and reputation amongst his or her peers in private practice 
or governmental service on legal issues; and 
■■	 If the candidate is a prior or current judge, his or her judicial decisions and reputation 
for independence and impartiality. 
4.	 Excellent oral and written communication skills  
Because of the important and often complex nature of the work undertaken by a Supreme Court, 
justices must not only be capable of properly analyzing the substance of an issue that is brought 
before the Court, they must also be able to communicate their ideas clearly, both orally and in 
writing. This means that candidates should possess advanced legal reasoning and analytical 
skills, both oral and written, and should be able to express their opinions clearly and properly to 
even a non-lawyer audience, i.e. the general citizenry of the nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 / 45 
To assess a candidate’s oral and written skills, it is important that at least a representative 
sampling of briefs, decisions, and other documents prepared by the candidate during his or her 
career be investigated and reviewed in an open hearing. The candidate’s reputation for presenta-
tions in professional forums and his or her performance at the open hearing should be consid-
ered as to the candidate’s oral communication skills. 
5.	 Highly developed creative intelligence and collaborative skills 
Given the nature and inherent pressures of the work performed by a Supreme Court and the 
potential impact of its decisions, justices should be prepared to deal creatively with new situa-
tions and problems. It is therefore important that justices possess the following characteristics: 
■■	 A problem-solving orientation; 
■■	 A capacity to build consensus; and 
■■	 An ability to take into account other people’s views. 
In order to assess these capacities, the candidate could present examples of situations in 
which those skills were applied in the past. These experiences should be examined and evaluat-
ed at the public hearing. 
6.	 Commitment to the judiciary as an independent institution 
The Supreme Court is not only the highest court in a country, but it is also plays a leadership role 
in the administration and organization of the judiciary. Therefore, candidates should demon-
strate an understanding of their responsibility for maintaining the judicial branch as a separate 
and independent public institution that acts as a counterbalance to the nation’s executive and 
legislative branches of government. 
7.	 Demonstrated commitment to the protection of human rights, democratic val­
ues, and transparency 
Protection of individual human rights and democratic values are at the heart of modern de-
mocracies. Transparency of public administration is a critical element in assuring the effective 
operation of the rule of law and due process for all. 
Given the importance of these principles, Supreme Court candidates should prove their
commitment to such values through examples from past written documents and public state-
ments. These matters should be examined during the open hearings on a candidate’s nomi-
nation. 
8.	 Ability to understand the social and legal consequences of one’s decisions 
Because Supreme Court decisions often have such a significant impact on the social and eco-
nomic well-being of the country, justices must be aware of this responsibility and the need to act 
judiciously: a justice must have a judicial temperament. 
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If a candidate is a sitting judge, the open hearings should focus on his or her past judgments 
to assess this quality. Written material and public statements by the candidate should also be 
examined. 
9.	 Ability to strike a sound balance between a high level of productivity and care­
ful consideration of cases 
The work of a justice, in addition to being critically important for the country, is extremely 
demanding. Experience shows that many cases heard by a Supreme Court are complex and sen-
sitive. To ensure the timely delivery of justice—another fundamental human right that must be 
safeguarded by the judiciary—a Supreme Court works under great pressure. It is essential that 
the justices are able to find the right balance between maintaining a high level of productivity 
as well as ensuring high-quality decisions, based on a thorough analysis of the issues brought 
before them. 
Candidates for Supreme Court vacancies should demonstrate their experience with and 
aptitude for working in such an environment, by providing examples of pressured performance. 
These issues should be addressed during the open hearing. 
10. Diversity 
Because of its importance in the overall fabric of a nation’s government, the composition of a 
country’s Supreme Court should reasonably reflect its demographics. Therefore, as shown in 
the discussion of the recent appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, consideration should be 
given in the selection and approval process of the desire to see a fair representation of women 
as well as men. And there should be an effort to have justices from the various nationalities and 
ethnicities that are prevalent in the nation. 
Diversity decidedly does not mean that there should be a focus on the political party af-
filiations of the candidates. The whole point is to select and appoint competent, independent, 
impartial persons, with a judicial temperament and a commitment to the rule of law. That is not 
to say that politics will not play any role in the selection of potential candidates. The discussion 
of the process in the United States for the selection and approval of its Supreme Court justices 
demonstrates that politics is always a factor. But protections like life tenure, with guaranteed 
pay, and assurances through the transparent process of the open hearings, that a candidate pos-
sesses the proper—non-political— qualification articulated above, are critical to achieving a Su-
preme Court that will rule on the basis of the law, not the prevailing political party’s preferences. 
F.	 Education of the Nation’s Citizenry from an Early Age and 
Through Freedom of the Press and Speech 
As we have emphasized throughout this paper, experience across the globe has shown that, to 
have a legal system that is governed by judicial independence starts with impartial Supreme 
Court justices who will enforce the rule of law, with due process for all. Early, ongoing education 
is the best stimulus to the nation’s people becoming vocal about their demands for transparen-
cy in the selection and appointment process, and their expectation that justices with the right 
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qualities of independence and impartiality will be appointed. That requires courageous teachers 
and professors. 
The commitment to this essential education begins with the teachers, but ultimately the 
demand must come from the people. That demand can be fostered by the press and other me-
dia which must be equally forceful and courageous. The press should be an active promoter of 
public awareness of the importance of who is appointed to the nation’s Supreme Court and why. 
IN CONCLUSION, while no judicial system will be a perfect fit for every country, we are 
hopeful that this discussion will aid each country’s decisionmakers in tailoring a judicial sys-
tem—and a selection and approval process for its Supreme Court justices and other judges— 
that promotes both the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
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